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PROPERTY
by
James H. Wallenstein* and FrankA. St. Claire**

THIS Article

will continue to follow format guidelines established in the
Articles on Property for the previous two years.'
I.

STATUS OF TITLE

Ownership and Boundary Disputes. As in previous years, of the generally
3
recognized methods for proving title, 2 proof of title by adverse possession
received primary attention in litigation during the survey year. As is also
common, a recurring issue in such litigation was whether the claimant's
activities put the defending party on notice of an adverse claim. For
example, in Crisp v. Parker4 the court -reiterated the 1963 Texas Supreme
* B.A., Washington and Lee University; LL.B., Southern Methodist University.
Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
** B.S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D., New York University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. Wallenstein, Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 29 (1975)
[hereinafter referred to in the text as the 1975 Property Article and in subsequent
footnotes as Wallenstein (1975)] and Wallenstein, Property, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 27 (1974) [hereinafter referred to in the text as the 1974 Property
Article and in subsequent footnotes as Wallenstein (1974)].
2. The four generally recognized proofs of title are as follows: (1) proof of a
regular chain of conveyances from the sovereign of the land to one of the litigants; (2)
proof of a superior title in one litigant traced from a common source acknowledged by
both litigants; (3) proof of adverse possession by one litigant for the applicable
limitations period prescribed by statute; and (4) if neither litigant can prove superior
title by one of the first three methods, proof of one litigant's prior possession combined
with proof that such possession has not been abandoned. Land v. Turner, 377 S.W.2d
181, 183 (Tex. 1964). See also Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 364 (1966). For an analysis of the
fourth proof, actually merely a presumption which may be rebutted, see Reiter v. Coastal
States Gas Producing Co., 382 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. 1964); Whited v. Mullins, 515 S.W.2d
159 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1974, no writ).
3. This category of proof is authorized in several articles of the Texas Revised
Civil Statutes. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5507 (1958), the three-year statute,
requires that a claimant be in peaceable and adverse possession "under title or color of
title." Id. art. 5509, the five-year statute, requires a claimant to prove peaceable and
adverse possession (including cultivation, use or enjoyment) under "a deed or deeds duly
registered," along with payment of property taxes. Id. art. 5510, the ten-year statute,
requires cultivation, use or enjoyment by the adverse possessor plus "some written
memorandum of title" if the adverse possessor wishes to claim more than 160 acres. Id.
art. 5518, one of the three 25-year statutes, bars suit by a record owner despite any
disabilities (such as age, mental incapacity or military service) if not commenced within
25 years after his cause of action has accrued. Id. art. 5519, a second 25-year statute,
bestows good and marketable title on a good faith adverse possessor under a claim of
right (including a recorded deed, deeds or similar "instruments") after such a period. Id.
art. 5519a, the third 25-year statute, which unlike the prior articles gives the adverse
claimant merely a prima facie case and is not totally irrebutable, requires the adverse
claimant to show that he has exercised dominion over the land and paid all property
taxes on the land for 25 years and that the record owner has failed either to exercise
dominion or failed to pay at least one year's taxes on the land in the prior 25 years. For
a recent discussion of these statutes see Symposium, Texas Land Titles: Part 11, 7 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 58, 78-111 (1975).
See also Larson, Limitations on Actions for Real
Property: the Texas Five-Year Statute, 18 Sw. L.J. 385 (1964); Larson, Texas Limitations: The Twenty-Five Year Statutes, 15 Sw. L.J. 177 (1961).
4. 516 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ).
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Court decision of Todd v. Bruner5 that "[p]ossession, coupled with payment
of taxes, is not notice to a cotenant of a repudiation of the common title.",,
In another case involving cotenants, Hines v. Pointer,7 the court acknowledged the general rule that a deed purporting to convey the entire fee from
one cotenant to a "stranger to title," followed by the entry upon and
possession of the property for five years by the stranger under claim of the
deed, would meet the requirements for proving title under the five-year
statute.8 In that case, however, the court refused to equate the continued
possession of the grantor-cotenant's lessee with possession by the stranger in
the absence of actual notice to the other cotenants that the stranger and
lessee were asserting a different claim of right. The claim of title by adverse
possession was, therefore, denied.
In Sims v. Cage9 the court held that when a claimant or his predecessor in
possession loses a trespass to try title action but continues to use the property
for pasturing cattle, such use is 'to be characterized as being merely permissive and, thus, insufficient to constitute adverse possession. Two other
"fencing and grazing" cases were also handed down during the survey year.
As usual, the determinative inquiry in each case was whether the fencing in
of the land had been purposeful or merely "casual" or "incidental."' 10 Thus,
in Mixon v. Clark" the court held that where a tract of land had been
purposefully fenced in and used by the possessor for grazing purposes during
the statutory period, such use was sufficient notice of a hostile claim to
support a claim of adverse possession under the ten-year statute. A contrary
result was reached in Chapa v. Garcia,1 2 in which the court found the
fencing to be incidental as a result of the fencing in of surrounding tracts
and, therefore, not sufficient to trigger the running of the limitation period.
Three cases were decided during the survey year on issues of an estoppel
nature. In two of those cases would-be adverse possessors who offered to
purchase the land from their respective record holders prior to the running of
the period of limitation found that such an offer precluded their further use
of the property as being labelled "adverse."' 3 In the third case, 1 4 although
a grantor continued using his formerly owned property for more than forty
years after he had delivered a deed to the record title holder, the court held
that his continued use and possession, in the absence of a repudiation of the
5. 365 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. 1963).
6. Id. at 160, quoted in Crisp v. Parker, 516 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1974, no writ).
7. 523 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
8. Jones v. Silver, 129 Tex. 18, 100 S.W.2d 352 (1937).
9. 523 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
10. See Comment, Seasonal Use of Land for Business Purposes as Regards Quality
of Adverse Possession, 21 BAYLOR L. REv. 217 (1969).
11. 518 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
12. 513 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
13. Tex-Wis Co. v. Johnson, 525 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ
granted); Wolgamot v. Corley, 523 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
14. Haynes v. Dunn, 518 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
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deed and actual notice to the record holder that the possession was adverse,
did not constitute adverse possession.15
In Morris v. Texas Elks Crippled Children's Hospital, Inc.16 the court,
after noting that the disabilities statute17 (which tolls the running of the
limitations period in certain instances) does not include the mere lack of
knowledge of adverse possession, reaffirmed earlier holdings' s that the
statutes of limitation run against those who inherit an interest in land
regardless of whether or not they are aware of their inheritance. The court
also held, in a rather unique divided opinion,' that although a party's
silence could constitute a fraudulent concealment of possession-thereby
tolling the running of the limitations period-when such party had a
fiduciary obligation to the record title holder, no such fiduciary obligation
20
should be asserted against the adverse possessors in this case.
Finally, in Kleckner v. McClure21 the court acknowledged that adverse
possessors in privity with each other may tack their respective periods of
adverse possession in order to establish adverse possession for one entire
limitation period. 22 However, in what appears to be a case of first
impression in the state, the court further concluded that when title by
adverse possession does mature in a current adverse possessor, tacking is no
longer available and title can be transferred thereafter only by a deed.
Effect of Conveyances. In cases analyzing the effect of ambiguities in
instruments of conveyance, courts generally apply the rule of construction
that "words of doubtful meaning must be construed against the grantor." 23
For example, in Louisiana-PacificCorp. v. Cain,'2 4 regarding a timber deed
which permitted the grantee to extend the term six months "because of
uncertainty of weather," the court construed the phrase as merely stating the
reason for which the extension option was included in the deed rather than
creating a condition precedent to its exercise. Similarly, in Dickerson v.
15. Accord, Toscano v. Delgado, 506 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1974, no writ).
16. 525 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
17. TEX. REv.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5518 (Supp. 1975-76).
18. McCook v. Amarada Petroleum Corp., 93 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1936, writ dism'd); Krausse v. Hardin, 222 S.W. 310 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1920, writ dism'd).
19. The published opinion includes an "opinion" by one justice, a "dissent" by the
chief justice, an order signed by the third justice converting the original dissent into the
opinion of the court, and a final dissent written by the original writing justice.
20. Actually the obligation was claimed against the predecessor-grantor of the
adverse possessors, who as executor under a probated will failed to advise certain heirs
(claimants in this case) of their possible rights to the property under another will which
was not probated.
21. 524 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ).
22. Sterling v. Tarvin, 456 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
23. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Cain, 519 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1291
(1962); Moody v. Moody Nat'l Bank, 522 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Welch v. Straach, 518 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco),
rev'd, 531 S.W.2d 319 (1975); Rogers v. Nixon, 275 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1955, writ ref'd); Symposium, Texas Land Titles, 6 ST. MARY's L.J. 802,
816-23 (1974).
24. 519 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Keller25 the court interpreted an agreement in a deed stating that the
grantee would "care for me [the grantor] for the rest of my life" as a
covenant rather than a condition subsequent giving rise to a forfeiture in the
absence of express words of condition. 26 The court also held that where the
life tenant has an unqualified power to dispose of the property during her
lifetime, the remaindermen possess only a contingent remainder interest and
have no justifiable interest in any of the property except that remaining
undisposed of at the life tenant's death.
In -two cases defective instruments were remedied by court interpretation.
In Lewisville State Bank v. Blanton27 the interest of a judgment lien creditor
was held to be inferior to the equitable title of a grantee who had received a
deed from the debtor prior to the filing of an abstract of judgment, even
though the debtor still retained legal title because the deed contained an
2
insufficient description of the property. The court in Kunkel v. Kunkel 8
held that, even though a wife had failed to sign a deed for which vendor's
lien notes had been given, her signing and acknowledgment of a final
and acknowledgment of the
vendor's lien release was equivalent to a signing
29
ratification.
of
doctrine
the
deed itself under
An interesting distinction was drawn in Coastal Industrial Water Authority
v. York"0 between submerged lands and lands which have been taken into a
navigable stream by reason of erosion. The court, after acknowledging the
settled rule of law that in the latter instance title to such land is entirely lost
by the property owner (reverting to the state),-' held that such rule did not
[i.e., the boundaries
apply in the former instance "as long as the boundaries
32
originally granted] can be reasonably identified."
An analysis of Mexican law regarding abandonment, which was in effect in
Texas 135 years ago, is found in State v. Superior Oil Co.,53 holding that
after an extensive lapse of time a presumption arises that every act which
would tend to bar a claim has been done and that while such a presumption
such a period of time it becomes, for all
is ordinarily one of fact, after
34
law.
of
one
purposes,
practical
The case of Hoover v. Materi35 concerned how the proceeds of a partition
sale should be distributed between the two bidding cotenants, when, after
25. 521 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
26. Cf. Wallenstein (1975) at 31.

27. 520 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 525
S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1975).

28. 515 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
29. But see Click v. Seale, 519 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ),

where a wife was permitted to enjoy the benefits of a lease while rejecting a purchase

option contained in the lease.
30. 520 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975), af'd, 19 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 146 (Jan. 31, 1976).

31. See Hancock v. Moore, 135 Tex. 619, 146 S.W.2d 369 (1941).
32. 520 S.W.2d at 502.

33. 526 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ).

34. Accord, Clements v. Texas Co., 273 S.W. 993, 998 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1925, writ ref'd).

35. 515 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

had been before the El Paso court of appeals on two previous occasions.

The case

See Hoover v.

El Paso Nat'l Bank, 498 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Spires v. Hoover, 466 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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commencement of partition proceedings, one cotenant encumbers his interest. In Hoover the nonencumbering cotenant claimed that he was at a
disadvantage since both cotenants had been required to bid subject to an
indebtedness for which only one was personally liable. Notwithstanding
such claim, the court affirmed an equal division of the proceeds between the
cotenants (without regard to the lien). It rejected the claim primarily on
the nonencumbering cotenant's failure to preserve his rights during the
proceedings.36 One of the most interesting aspects of the case, however, is
the possibility of a lienholder subsequent to the commencement of the
partition action not receiving payment upon sale.37 Since the judgment
reflects the rights of the parties at the commencement of the partition action,
the proceeds in most cases would be, except on motion by one of the parties
(or perhaps the lienholder himself), distributed directly to the cotenants and
would require the lienholder to take the necessary steps for the enforcement
88
of a money judgment.
Finally, the fiduciary nature of cotenancy was reflected in Rudford v.
Coker39 in which the court held that, in the absence of the consent of the
other cotenants, a cotenant who purchases an adversary claim to the estate at
a foreclosure sale or trustee's sale under deed of trust does so for the benefit
of all the cotenants and does not thereby acquire title to the interests of his
40
cotenants.
Easements and Other Rights. In Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Kirkpatrick the court
held that "every easement carries with it the right to do whatever is
reasonably necessary for the full enjoyment of the easement itself '" 4' and
that in the absence of an inherently dangerous activity, physical invasion, or
negligence, no recovery in tort was available to the owner of the servient
estate.4 2 Additionally, when the activity is not "intrinsically dangerous" the
owner of the easement who employs an independent contractor to perform
the work will not be liable for the negligence of the independent contractor.
In Hicks v. City of Houston43 the court held that while the mere non-use of
an easement is not sufficient to constitute abandonment, if the non-use is
continued for an extended period without explanation, an inference arises as
36. Cf. Pyland v. Sayers, 148 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1940), rev'd
on other grounds, 161 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1942), where the court stated: "[Als between
cotenants where a lien exists only against the moiety of one, and a partition is affected
whereby the other assumes the outstanding debt, the conveyance to him thus creates a
lien against the entire property so conveyed to him." (Emphasis added.)
37. See 515 S.W.2d at 408. See also Annot., Partition as Affecting Pre-existing
Mortgage or Other Lien or Undivided Interest, 93 A.L.R. 1267 (1934). No Texas cases

are listed in the opinion and none directly on point could be located.
38. See Arnold v. Butterbaugh, 92 Ind. 403 (1884); A. Kiefer Drug Co. v. De Lay,
63 Ind. App.639, 115 N.E. 71 (1917).
39. 519 S.W.2d 934 (Tex.Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).

40. For a discussion of the right of a cotenant to reimbursements for improvements,
see Comment, The Right of a Cotenant to Reimbursement for Improvements to the
Common Property, 18 BAYLOR L. REv. 111 (1966).

41. 514 S.W.2d 789 (Tex.Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
42. Id. at 792. The court noted that inallthe earlier Texas crop dusting cases
where there has been no physical invasion of the plaintiffs' premises by the crop duster,
the courts have uniformly required a finding of negligence as a condition precedent to
imposition of liability. Id. at 793.
43. 524 S.W.2d 539 (Tex.Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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to an intention to abandon. The case of Parshall v. Crabtree" revealed
that an easement of necessity could be created, even where the effect of
easement would still not give the dominant estate access to a public road, as
long as permissive access was available from an adjacent landowner to the
servient estate. And in Williams v. Cassel 45 the mere mentioning in a
deed of a proposed road on a boundary of the property conveyed was held to
be insufficient to establish an easement along that boundary. Finally, in
Harris v. Phillips Pipeline Co.4 6 the court also recognized that an expansible
easement gives to the grantee a present interest in the entire land described
47
in the easement.
Fraud, Duress and Undue Influence. The case of Rodriguez v. Garcia48
represents a classic case of undue influence. The alleged grantor, a seventythree-year-old man of Mexican ancestry, was unable to read, speak, or
understand English and suffered from several physical disabilities including
poor hearing and memory. On the way to the hospital for surgery, his
niece-who had not visited him for twenty years prior to accompanying him
on that day-induced him to sign and deliver to her mineral deeds, which
provided his sole source of income, on the pretext that he was signing a
social security application. Not surprisingly, the court found ample evidence
to support the trial court's findings of lack of mental capacity of the grantor
and undue influence by his niece.
In Moore County v. Bergner49 a court, in failing to enforce an alleged
oral easement, refused to extend the application of the doctrine of estoppel
in pais ° in the absence of a showing of detrimental reliance.51 In Maykus
v. FirstCity Realty & Financial Corp.52 the court held that a letter of intent
to form a joint venture for the acquisition and development of two particular
tracts of land was sufficient to create a partnership relationship even though
details of the proposed venture were left for future agreement. Furthermore, since a partnership existed, each party owed a fiduciary duty to the
other and could be pursued if such duty were violated, notwithstanding a
provision in the letter limiting the liability of the defendant to $2,000 on
failure of the parties to enter into a joint venture contract. The court also
held that the remedy of imposing a constructive trust on the failure of the
defendant to fulfill his fiduciary duty as "trustee" in acquiring property was
44. 516 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
45. 515 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ).
46. 517 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
47. Accord, Strauch v. Coastal States Crude Gathering Co., 424 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, writ dism'd); Williams v. Humble Pipe Line Co., 417
S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1967, no writ).
48. 519 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
49. 526 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ).
50. The doctrine provides a narrow exception to the requirement that an easement
must be created in writing. In Texas the doctrine is only operative where there has been
an easement granted orally and the recipient of the easement right has expended monies
which will be lost and valueless if the right to enjoy the easement is revoked. See
Harrison v. Boring & Kenealy, 44 Tex. 255 (1875).
51. The requirement of detrimental reliance as an element of estoppel in pais was
expressed by the supreme court in Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196
(Tex.1962).
52. 518 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
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proper and not barred by the "clean hands" doctrine or the statute of frauds
by reason of insufficient description of the property.
In Stephens County Museum, Inc. v. Swenson5 3 the Texas Supreme
Court, recognizing that a recorded deed does not always imply a valid
conveyance, held that, while filing an instrument of record establishes both a
prima facie case of delivery and the accompanying presumption that the
grantor intended to convey according to the terms of the deed, the presumption of intent can be overcome by showing (i) that the deed was delivered or
recorded for a different purpose, (ii) that fraud, accident, or mistake was
involved in the delivery or recordation, or (iii) -that the grantor had no
54
intention to divest himself of the title.
A plaintiff's attempts to use the doctrine of promissory estoppel to avoid
the limitation pleas of the defendant and to defeat the defendant's plea of
the statute of frauds were rejected in Clifton v. Ogle.55 With regard to the
statute of frauds, the court held that although the doctrine of promissory
estoppel had been applied in a recent supreme court case,", the doctrine
should be used only in the event that the statute of frauds itself would
otherwise operate to defraud. With regard to the limitation plea the court
found nothing in the limitation statute which would in itself operate to
defraud if the doctrine of promissory estoppel were not honored.
The court in Goldring v. Goldring,5 7 relying on Rosenbaum v. Texas
Building & Mortgage Co.,5s held that, if a person who is induced by fraud
to enter into a contract continues to receive benefits under the contract
subsequent to his discovery of the fraud or otherwise acts in such a manner
as to recognize the contract as binding, such conduct acts as affirmation of
the contract and a waiver of his right of recission regardless of the absence of
express ratification. In Nobles v. Marcus59 the court held that while a
creditor may maintain an action in equity to vacate a fraudulent conveyance
of his debtor's land, he may not maintain an action to set aside a deed on the
ground of fraud upon the debtor (rather than fraud upon the creditor's legal
rights). Finally, in Seegers v. Spradleyn° the court, relying on the 1974
supreme court decision of Meadows v. Bierschwale,61 held that a relationship between the purchasers of property and the guarantor of their purchasemoney indebtedness was one of mutual trust and confidence and, therefore,
subject to a constructive trust with regard to oral promises by the purchaser
to give the guarantor the right to purchase an interest in the property.
53. 517 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. 1974).
54. For example, the recorded deed may be for the purposes of collateral in a
security agreement. Compare Davis Bros. v. Misco Leasing, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 908 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ), with Moran v. Kenai Towing & Salvage, Inc., 523
P.2d 1237 (Alas. 1974).
55. 526 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
56. "Moore" Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1972).
57. 523 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ dism'd).
58. 140 Tex. 325, 167 S.W.2d 506 (1943).
59. 524 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ granted).
60. 522 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
61. 516 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1974). The court held that a fiduciary relationship was
not always a condition precedent to the imposition of a constructive trust. See
Wallenstein (1975) at 33.
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Title Insurance. The concept of bar-related title insurance, discussed
(somewhat disparagingly) in the 1974 Property Article 62 and the 1975
Property Article,63 became law during the survey year. The new Texas
Title Insurance Act 64 will be discussed more fully in another article in this
Survey issue; 65 however, certain essential aspects of the act, such as barrelated title insurance, will be mentioned in this Article. Article 9.56 of the
Act authorizes the incorporation and operation of an "attorney's title insurance company," to be governed by all provisions of the Act except as
expressly modified in article 9.56. Perhaps the most significant modification
is the reduction of the capital stock and surplus requirement (from $1,000,000.00 and $400,000.00, respectively, to $250,000.00 and $150,000.00) for
any attorney's title insurance company created as an affiliate or subsidiary of
the State Bar of Texas or a foundation created by the State Bar of Texas. 66
However, although the easing of the capital and surplus requirements may
give bar-related title insurers an advantage over other companies, the article
does place the same rigorous-and expensive-standards for abstracting
(including access to an abstract plant) upon the attorney's title insurance
company. Other provisions in the Act which are worthy of reference
include those relating to the Real 'Estate Settlement Procedures Act of
197467 and the specific authorization for "insured closing letters." 68
The legislature was not the only governmental body active in the field of
title insurance during the survey year. The State Board of Insurance also
participated in some important changes. In August, for example, the board
authorized the first increase in premium rates since 1968,69 and during the
last few months of the year the board revised and added several title
insurance forms, procedural rules and rate rules. 70 Finally, in December
the board repealed most of its prior bulletins 71 and made public (to be
included in title insurance manuals) those bulletins which were not re72
pealed.
In one case tangentially involving title insurance, American Savings &
Loan Ass'n v. Musick,73 the supreme court reviewed the scope of the
62. Wallenstein (1974) at 34-35.
63. Wallenstein (1975) at 35.
64. Tax. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 9.01-.56 (Pamphlet Supp. 1975-76).
65. Brin, Insurance Law, p. 195 infra.
66. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 9.56 (Pamphlet Supp. 1975-76). Although a state
bar subcommittee is now working towards the creation of such an attorney's title
insurance company, none has been established as of this date.
67. Id. arts. 9.53, .54. For mention of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of
1974 see footnote 133 infra and accompanying text.
68. Tax. INs. CODE ANN. art. 9.49 (Pamphlet Supp. 1975-76).
69. Order No. 29432 of the State Board of Insurance (Aug. 13, 1975).
70. A complete set of the existing forms and rules can be obtained from Hart
Graphics in Austin, Texas.
71. Orders No. 30019 and 30020 of the State Board of Insurance (Dec. 1, 1975).
72. Since Jan. 1, 1946, the State Board of Insurance has issued bulletins in
accordance with its regulatory responsibility. Prior to the recent board orders, these
bulletins were generally sent only to title insurance companies; however, they often
contained comments of significance to attorneys and realtors. For a discussion of a
controversial bulletin issued in 1973 inconnection with the "survey exception" in title
policies (which bulletin has been repealed by the recent board orders), see Wallenstein
(1974) at 34.
73. 19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 105 (Dec. 17, 1975), rev'g 517 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974).
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election of remedies doctrine and concluded that a suit for trespass to try title
could be pursued by a holder of title insurance even after the insured had
processed a claim against his title company alleging a failure of title. 74
Miscellaneous Cases. In W.H. Betts v. Texas Pacific Land Trust75 the
court held that validity of a land patent was not subject to attack by one
whose only claim to the land arose subsequent to the issuance of the patent.
The court in Rayson v. Johns7" held that a factual question exists where
there is conflicting evidence as to whether property in a partition proceeding
is susceptible to division in kind. In Kropp v. Prather77 the court held that,
since in Texas the filing of a lis pendens is a part of a judicial proceeding
involving real estate without which the lis pendens would be non-existent, it
would not be the basis for a cause of action in libel or slander. In Miller v.
Gasaway78 the court held that the owner of a fee interest who occupies the
land by right of homestead or of life estate cannot charge the remaindermen
with the value of any permanent improvements made upon the property
during the time the property was occupied under the homestead right or life
estate. Instead, the remaindermen in a partition action would be entitled to
share in the value of the improvements in the same proportions as they then
own the fee, subject to the "betterments" exception to this general rule. 79
Finally, in Schwartz v. Jefferson"0 the supreme court held that property
adjudications in a divorce decree become final the same as in other
judgments relating to title and possession of property.
II.

PURCHASES AND OTHER TRANSACTIONS

Contract Validity and Interpretation. In addition to the traditional line of
cases discussing whether the property description in a purported contract is
sufficient to enforce the contract, 8 several noteworthy contract issues were
74. "The claim against the title insurance company is based on a contractual right
that exists separate and distinct from any final determination of ownership of the
property .

. .

. There is certainly no inconsistency between seeking a defense by the

title insurance company and filing a trespass to try title action." 19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at
110.
75. 524 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
76. 524 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
77. 526 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
78. 514 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, no writ).

79. The exception provides that when the life tenant and partial fee owner is under

the mistaken belief that he is the owner of the entire fee, he is entitled to recover the
improvements or alternatively the amount by which they have enhanced the land (in
addition, of course, to his portion of the fee). However, in order to qualify as a good

faith improver, he must show not only that he believed that he was the true owner, but
also that he had reasonable grounds for that belief, and that he was ignorant that his title
was contested by any person having a better right. See also 4 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REA. PROPERTY 36 (1961); Symposium, Texas
Land Titles: Part11, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 58, 112-17 (1975).

80. 520 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1975).
81. See Pockrus v. Connelly, 521 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), in which the court held that a description by street, lot, and block
number was sufficient, notwithstanding the absence of any reference to the official
county records. The court in Pockrus followed the test set out by the Texas Supreme
Court, that "to be sufficient, the writing must furnish within itself, or by reference to
some other existing writing, the means or data by which the land to be conveyed may be

identified with reasonable certainty."

Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex.
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addressed by Texas courts during the survey year. For example, in Pockrus
v. Connelly82 the court held that the contractual requirement of a "cash"
down payment permitted the purchaser to tender his personal check instead of
paper money, coins, or a more reliable evidence of a legal tender such as a
money order or cashier's check.83 In Hill v. Rich84 the court discussed the
requirement that an offeree either accept a real estate offer in writing within
a reasonable period of time after receipt of the offer, or, if earlier, within the
time period specified in the offer.8 5
,For real estate developers who execute contracts to purchase real property
in the name of an individual as "trustee" for an undisclosed purchasing
group the case of Gorme v. Axelrad8 6 should provide some qualified
comfort. In that case the individual who executed a contract of sale as
"trustee" disclosed at the time of execution that he was acting as agent for an
undisclosed principal who would, together with the "trustee," constitute the
actual purchasing group. However, at the date set for consummation of the
sale, the seller refused to accept a purchase-money promissory note from the
"trustee" and the undisclosed additional purchaser, claiming that the contract
was unenforceable because the real purchasers had not been named. The
court rejected the seller's claim, reasoning (1) that the use of the word
"trustee" on the face of the contract indicated the interest of others in the
contract and (2) that the seller's rights were in no way prejudiced but
instead were enhanced by the liability of the other purchaser for the balance
due. The second rationale of the court should suggest to real estate brokers
that the Gorme decision may not be helpful in cases where a broker wishes
to substitute the actual purchaser instead of adding an additional party. In
such cases the broker should include in the contract an express assignment
authorization. 87 In Taggert v. Crews8 8 the real estate broker used a form
of brokerage listing agreement instead of a "trustee" contract, which weak1972). See also Wallenstein (1975) at 35-36; Wallenstein (1974) at 35-36; Note,
Statute of Frauds-Sufficiency of Description, 24 BAYLOR L. REv. 413 (1972). But cf.
U.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. Dauley, 524 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975,

writ granted).
82. 521 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
83. It should be noted that the court did not mention the possible alternatives of a
money order or a cashier's check. Moreover, the facts of the Pockrus case indicate that
the sellers had quite likely concocted the "cash" requirement argument as a mere
rationale to disguise their unwillingness to consummate the transaction. Possibly the

requirement of a "cash" down payment would be interpreted more strictly in a different
factual situation.
84. 522 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

85. By implication the court suggested that an offeror must hold open an offer for a
reasonable time even if no consideration has been given by the offeree. Although
statutory authority for such a concept is available in TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE § 2.205
(1968) with regard to sales of personalty by merchants, no case authority could be found

by the authors of this Article to support this implication as a general rule of law. Cf.
Echols v. Bloom, 485 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ

ref'd n.r.e.).

86. 519 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
87. Real estate brokers should also be aware of the conflict-of-interest challenge
which may arise out of "trustee" contracts. See Anderson v. Griffith, 501 S.W.2d 695
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in Wallenstein (1975) at
42. Moreover, inasmuch as § 2 of the Texas Trust Act, TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
7425b-2 (1960), expressly excludes from the Act "so-called 'Massachusetts Trusts' or

similar business trusts" and "instruments wherein one or more persons are mere
nominees for one or more persons without any disclosed beneficiaries and without any
active trust duties," all persons who utilize this form of party designation should realize
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ened his principal's claim for enforcement even though the principal had
been named in the listing agreement. However, in reversing a trial court's
granting of the seller's motion for summary judgment, the court acknowledged that the broker's principal could enforce the contract if it were found
as a matter of fact that the contracting parties intended to create contractual
s9
benefits for the principal.
The question of whether "time was of the essence" 90 arose in at least four
real estate contract cases during the survey year. In three of those cases the
courts held that in the absence of a specific provision time was not of the
essence and, therefore, failure to close on time did not necessarily constitute
a breach of the contract. 91 In White v. Miller,92 however, the court held that
since the contract was properly characterized as an "option," time was of
the essence. The authors of this Article have reviewed White v. Miller
carefully, as well as certain aspects of the contract in question which were
not mentioned in the court's opinion, 93 and believe that the result may have
been correct, but not because of the "financing" contingency relied upon to
some extent by the court. 94 In Herzstein v. Echols & Lynn9 5 the court held
that liability under the contract may arise in either the "trustee" or the undisclosed
beneficiary, or both, under the law of principal and agent (and the law of partnership, if
the "trustee" is also included in the beneficiary group). For an extensive discussion of
this problem and others see Comment, A Device for Texas Land Development: The
Illinois Land Trust, 10 Hous. L. REV. 692 (1973).
88. 521 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ).
89. See Simmons & Simmons Constr. Co. v. Rea, 155 Tex. 353, 286 S.W.2d 415
(1955) (intention is usually inference to be drawn by fact finder from other facts and
circumstance in evidence).
90. See Note, Time is of the Essence: Condition or Covenant?, 27 BAYLOR L. REV.
817 (1975).
91. Tabor v. Ragle, 526 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Helsley v. Anderson, 519 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ);
Herzstein v. Echols & Lynn, 517 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.--Dallas 1974, no writ). In
the Helsley case the court's decision of enforcement was rendered even though almost
two years had elapsed between the closing date set out in the contract of sale and the
date of purchaser's demand for performance. In reversing the trial court's conclusion
that the purchaser was estopped by laches, the court noted that this extraordinary
equitable remedy is available only when two essential elements are present: (1) an
unreasonable delay in the assertion of one's legal or equitable rights and (2) a good faith
change of position by another to his detriment because of the delay. See City of Fort
Worth v. Johnson, 388 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. 1964).
92. 518 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ dism'd).
93. In White the court held that the contract (allowing the purchaser thirty days to
obtain financing and providing that, if financing was not arranged within the period, the
contract was void at the seller's option) constituted an option contract. Id. at 385.
94. The court stated that the test for distinguishing a contract for sale from an
option contract is whether (i) one party is obligated to sell and the other party is
obligated to purchase or (ii) the document confers merely a right to purchase upon the
party's election. The court construed the purchaser's deposit of the $5,000 earnest
money as the consideration for his option, although apparently the deposit was returned
to the purchaser upon the seller's election. Ironically, this might indicate that it was not
an option contract after all but rather a contract with contingencies. See Willeford v.
Walker, 499 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no writ); Huckleberry
v. Wilson, 284 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1955, writ dism'd) (holding that
by entering into a contract of sale where final consummation is contingent upon
purchaser's obtaining specified financing, purchaser impliedly promises to pursue loan
application with reasonable diligence); cf. U.S. Freight Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d
887 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (Distinction made between contract to purchase property at a future
date and an option contract. Such distinction was determinative as to whether the loss
was deductible as a capital loss or as an ordinary loss.).
95. 517 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ). See also Ayers v.
Hodges, 517 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ).
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that the seller had the burden of showing that a utility easement was
permitted by a contract of sale which provided that "utility easements which
do not adversely affect the value of the property

. .

.

shall not be deemed to

be title defects." 96 Additionally, the court held that the purchaser's statement to the seller's agent that he would not close the transaction on any
condition did not constitute an actual breach when made before the time for
performance. In light of the seller's treatment of the contract as continuing,
the statement could not be deemed an anticipatory breach.
In a case involving a real estate installment sales contract, 97 the court held
that article 1301b of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes9" is expressly limited
by its language to situations of forfeiture and acceleration due to a purchaser's default and has no application to actions for cancellation and rescission.
The court distinguished rescission and forfeiture: forfeiture being the assertion of a right granted by contract and declared pursuant to contract;
rescission being the abrogation of the contract and restoration of the parties
to the positions they respectively occupied before the contract was made. ,In
Bouldin v. Woosely9 9 the court held that an agency relationship between two
tenants-in-common, once established and in the absence of any action to
revoke it, is presumed to continue through the execution and consummation
of a purchase option by the cotenant's lessee.
Finally, two cases involved the severability of a lease and an option of the
tenant to purchase the leased premises. In Farrell v. Evans'00 the court
held that, although a purchase option is generally not assignable by the
optionee unless permission for an assignment is evidenced by the terms of
the option, such permission is evidenced in a lease which contains both a
purchase option in favor of the tenant and a clause permitting the tenant to
assign all of his rights under the lease. However, in Click v. Seale,' 0 ' a
case somewhat in conflict with Farrell as to the concept of severability in
lease-purchase options, the court held that the lease and purchase option in
question was severable; therefore, the statutory repudiation rights accorded
to a wife at the time of the contract could be utilized by her to defeat 0the
2
purchase option without disturbing the lease obligations of the parties.1
Remedies. In National Resort Communities, Inc. v. Cain'0 3 the supreme
court set out two requirements for reformation of a contract of sale: first,
96. This provision is found in the Contract of Sale form (Form 1971-S), published
by the Greater Dallas Board of Realtors. In the residential contract form proposed by
the Broker-Lawyer Joint Committee sponsored by the State Bar of Texas and the Texas
Real Estate Commission (see note 111 infra and accompanying text) the following
provision is used to describe permitted easements: "utility easements common to any
regularly platted subdivision where Property is located."
97. Marshall v. Garcia, 514 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ

ref'd n.r.e.).
98. TEX.

REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.

1301b (Supp. 1975-76).

99. 525 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
100. 517 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ).
101. 519 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ).
102. Accord, Estapa v. Saldana, 200 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1947,
no writ).
103. 526 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. 1975).
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the party seeking reformation "must prove the true agreement of the
parties"; second, "the provision erroneously written (or included or omitted)
into the instrument was there by mutual mistake."'10 4 The court found the
requirements had not been met, concluding that, since the seller had
remained willing to rescind the contracts, each purchaser had an adequate
remedy at law-either to rescind his contract or to stand upon the contract
as written.
In Dickey v. Johnson'"' the court held that a seller could maintain an
action to recover the purchaser's earnest money even though no actual
tender of deed occurred, as long as the trial court had found that the seller
was "ready and willing to execute a deed to the purchaser."' 10 A dissent
noted that at no time did the seller and his wife tender a deed properly
executed and acknowledged, thereby failing to show ability to perform the
contract.
A procedural matter which should pose a warning for those seeking
summary judgment arose in Kain v. Neuhaus.107 The court held attachment of unsworn and uncertified copies of earnest money contracts to an
affidavit which the affiant refers to as true and correct is insufficient to make
the contracts "sworn or certified
copies" required by rule 166-A(e) of the
0 8s
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
Home Warranty Insurance. The Sixty-fourth Legislature, evidently responding to requests from home-builder organizations, 10 9 enacted a new
article 5.53-A of the Insurance Code"10 which authorizes fire insurance and
marine insurance companies to issue a "home warranty insurance" policy.
The term "home warranty insurance" is defined in article 5.53-A as
"assuring either (1) performance by builders of residential property of their
warranty obligations to purchasers of such property; or (2) against named
defects arising from failure of the builder to construct residential property in
accordance with specified construction standards."
Regulation of Brokers Drafting Contracts. The first standard form real
estate contract, drafted by the Broker-Lawyer Joint Committee sponsored by
104. Id. at 513, 514. The court referred to its 1972 decision in Morrow v. Shotwell,

477 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. 1972), as the basis of its requirements for reformation.
105. 513 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
106. Id. at 877. The court distinguished two earlier cases, Milliken v. Townsend, 16
S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, jdgmt adopted), and Gibson & Johnson v. Ward,
355 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931, no writ), involving actual tender by
the seller, by stating that neither case "held that a finding by a trial court that a seller
and his wife were ready and willing to sign a deed would be insufficient." 513 S.W.2d at
877.
107. 515 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ).
108. TEx. R. Cv. P. 166-A(e) provides that "sworn or certified copies of all papers
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith."
But cf. Pinemont Bank v. Du Croz, 528 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
109. It should be noted, however, that some small home-builders, whose opinions
were expressed in the legislature by Representative Al Korioth of Farmers Branch,
argued against the proposal on the basis that it was an unnecessary expense to home
builders and purchasers. See Warranty Bill OK'd, The Dallas Morning News, March 21,
1975, at 13A, col. 2.
110. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.53-A (Pamphlet Supp. 1975-76). See also id. art.
6.01-A, 21.28-C (further provisions relating to home warranty insurance).
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the State Bar of Texas and the Texas Real 'Estate Commission,"' was
delivered to real estate brokers in Texas during December 1975.112 Al-

though the form contract, which is limited to residential transactions involving the assumption of an existing loan, was characterized as a final draft of

the committee's work, the authors of this Article have been advised that the
committee will accept and review comments and critiques submitted during
the first few months of calendar year 1976.
Brokerage. In two cases decided during the survey year, Pockrus v.
Connelly 1 and Cooper v. Wildman,1 4 Texas courts confirmed once
again' 15 that in litigation for brokerage commissions real estate brokers may
recover attorneys' fees pursuant to article 2226 of the Texas Revised Civil
Statutes, even when suit is premised on a written brokerage agreement
containing no specific provision for attorneys' fees.I 16
In Wagner v. Hall" 7 a prospective seller sued his real estate broker
because of a fraudulent misappropriation by the broker's salesman. The
court agreed that the seller was entitled to recover the additional payments
he made on his mortgage during the period in which the house remained
empty (after the salesman's fraud caused the pending sale to be cancelled
and before the seller could obtain another purchaser), as well as the
difference between the higher net cash payment he would have received
pursuant to the original transaction and the net cash payment he ultimately
received. However, the court refused the seller recovery of exemplary
damages because there had been no showing of negligence on the part of the
broker in retaining the salesman.
In at least two cases decided during the survey year characterization of the
conveyed property as "a security" was in issue."18 In Thywissen v. FTI
Corp." 9 the court held (1) that the mere fact that the sale of an interest in
a corporation was consummated through a stock transfer, as distinguished
from a sale of assets, did not establish as a matter of law that the plaintiff
was engaged in the transaction as a securities broker, but (2) where, as here,
a sale of stock is the basis for a commission claim, it is the plaintiff's burden
to show that the agreement between plaintiff and defendant did not contem111. For discussions of the "Statement of Principles by the State Bar of Texas and
the Texas Real Estate Commission," which precipitated the formation of the Committee,

see Wallenstein (1974) at 37-38; Wallenstein (1975) at 40-41.
112. Copies of the form can be obtained from William W. Gibson, Jr., Professor of
Law, The University of Texas School of Law.
113. 521 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see note
81 supra.
114. 528 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ).
115. See Flagg Realtors, Inc. v. Harvel, 509 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo

1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in Wallenstein (1975) at 43.
116. Although the Cooper decision lists a few cases in support of its conclusion, in
each of those decisions, as well as in Flagg Realtors, the court failed to state with
certainty that the brokerage agreement was in writing. See also Clark Advertising
Agency, Inc. v. Tice, 490 F.2d 834, 838-39 (5th Cir. 1974), and cases cited therein
(indicating that a written contract may be a "special contract" falling outside the
coverage of TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Supp. 1975-76)).
117. 519 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ).

118. See Wallenstein (1975) at 43-44; Wallenstein (1974) at 40-42.
119. 518 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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plate the sale of real estate or securities. 120 In D & S Investments, Inc. v.
Mouer12 1 the court deferred to the "primary jurisdiction" of the Texas
Securities Commission for a determination of whether sales of joint venture
interests for purchasing real property constituted sales of "securities" within
the meaning of the Texas Securities Act. 122 The court concluded, therefore,
that the district court had no jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' declaratory
judgment action. In legislative action during the survey year the Sixtyfourth Legislature enacted four amendments to the Texas Securities Act, at
least two of which should have a significant impact upon real estate
syndications. 123 And in administrative action concerning real estate securities the Texas Securities Commission amended its Guidelines for the Registration of Real Estate Programs 124 concerning the amount of real estate
commissions on resale of the property. 125 And the Securities and Exchange
Commission, apparently acknowledging that its rule 146 concerning "private
offerings"'126 would not adequately ameliorate the dangers inherent in small
120. See also Remley v. Street, 523 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Maddox v. Flato, 423 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); McDonald & Co. v. Kemper, 386 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1965, no writ). The court in Thywissen also refused to recognize the
distinction claimed by the plaintiff between "finders" and real estate brokers (with a
"finder" being merely an intermediary who contracts to find and bring parties together
but leaves the negotiation of the ultimate transaction to the principals). 518 S.W.2d at
951. In the court's opinion such a distinction might allow a party to circumvent the
requirements of the Real Estate License Act and the Texas Securities Act merely by
showing that his services were less valuable than those expected of a broker. Id.; cf.
Avent v. Stinnett, 513 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ), discussed in
Wallenstein (1975) at 41; Sherman v. Bruton, 497 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1973, no writ), discussed in Wallenstein (1974) at 40.
121. 521 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
122. Tax. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-1 to -39 (1964). For an analysis of
Sunshine v. Mid-South Constr., Inc., 496 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), a 1973 Texas case which held that similar sales did not constitute sales of
real estate, therefore implying that they did constitute sales of securities, see Wallenstein
(1974) at 41. See also the cases and authorities cited in Wallenstein (1975) at 43; cf.
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), noted in 29 Sw. L.J.
987 (1975), holding that sales of interests in a certain co-operative housing project did
not constitute sales of "securities"; Grenader v. Spitz, 6 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
95,300, at 98,526 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), distinguishing the Supreme Court's United Housing
decision and holding that some co-operative housing interests were securities; Huberman
v. Denny's Restaurants, 337 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1972), holding that the sale to a
passive investor of fee simple title pursuant to a certain sale-lease "package", with the
tenant's rentals subject to increase in the event of increases in the tenant's gross sales,
constituted a sale of a security.
123. First, the Texas Securities Board was given express rule-making authority
pursuant to a new § 28-1 of the Act. And acting upon that authority the Board has
already adopted several rules, one set of which is a modified version of the "Guidelines
for the Registration of Real Estate Programs" which was first introduced by the Board
on May 24, 1974. See Wallenstein (1974) at 42; Wallenstein (1975) at 43. Second, §
34 of the Act, requiring a brokerage commission claimant to be a registered securities
dealer (with certain exceptions), was amended to remedy the defect found to exist by the
Waco court of civil appeals in the now infamous case of Rowland v. Integrated Systems
Technology, Inc., 488 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.), noted
in Wallenstein (1974) at 41. For an excellent analysis of all changes to the Act, see
Bateman & Dawson, The 1975 Amendments to the Business Corporation Act and the
Texas Securities Act, 6 Tax. TECH L. REV. 951, 995-1019 (1975).
124. 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 46,609, at 42,519-33 (1976).
125. Id. at 42,522. The amendment was announced in a letter dated June 19, 1975,
from Roy W. Mouer, Securities Commissioner.
126. SEC Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1974), adopted in SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5487 (April 23, 1974), amended in id. No. 33-5585 (May 7, 1975).
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offerings, 1 27 adopted rule 240,128 exempting from securities registration
offerings by a syndicator 129 (1) who does not have more than 100 security
holders in all of his syndications and (2) who has not during the sale in
question and the immediately preceding twelve months sold more than
$100,000.00 of securities in all of his syndications. 30
Finally, the Sixty-fourth Legislature enacted a revised version of the Real
Estate License Act,"' which among other changes includes much more
rigorous residential and educational requirements for real estate brokerage
licenses.
RESPA. The 1975 Property Article 8 2 mentioned that June 20, 1975, was
the effective date of the Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act of 1974
(RESPA). 133 Through this legislation the Ninety-third Congress moved to
protect residential buyers and sellers from the alleged abuses of excess
closing costs, kickbacks, and other unethical practices by lenders, brokers,
title insurance companies, and, in certain instances, sellers. What was not
predicted in that former article was the turbulence created in the real estate
industry by RESPA and regulation X13 4 promulgated by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for implementation of RESPA.
However, RESPA, regulation X, the recent amendments to regulation X,' 3 5
the RESPA legal opinions issued by the HUD general counsel, 36 and the
clouded future of RESPA in light of increasing industry and congressional
trade
concern, 13 7 have already been discussed thoroughly in numerous
18
publications, including one excellent law journal commentary. 3
Miscellaneous. The Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection
Act, 139 which early in the survey year was interpreted in Cape Conroe Ltd.
127. See Wallenstein (1975) at 44 n.107 (listing of law review articles related to SEC
rule 146). See also Weinberg & McManus, The Private Placement Exemption Under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 Revisited, and Rule 146, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 201
(1975).
128. SEC Rule 240, 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (1974), adopted in SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5560 (Jan. 24, 1975).
129. See generally 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 46,609 (1976).
130. For a thorough analysis of rule 240 see Erwin, A Useful Exemption from
Securities Registration for Smaller Real Estate Syndications: SEC Rule 240, 4 REAL
However, in the opinion of the authors of this Article, the
ESTATE L.J. 263 (1975).
aggregation of all syndications for determining maximum security holders and dollars
will render this rule ineffective for all but the occasional syndicator, and, therefore, it is
not of assistance to those in the business of syndication.
131. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a (Supp. 1975-76).
132. Wallenstein (1975) at 40.
133. Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-16 (Supp. IV, 1970).
134. SEC Reg. X, 24 C.F.R. pt. 82 (1975), added by 40 Fed. Reg. 22448 (1975).
135. See 40 Fed. Reg. 26509 (1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 47792 (1975).
136. See RESPA Legal Opinion No. 1, 40 Fed. Reg. 30480, 40 Fed. Reg. 31211
(1975), and RESPA Legal Opinion No. 2, 40 Fed. Reg. 44129 (1975).
137. In fact, HUD itself acknowledged the possibility of adverse congressional
activity in 40 Fed. Reg. 47792 (1975).
138. Whitman, The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act: How to ComplyProblems and Prospects, 4 REAL ESTATE L.J. 223' (1976). (Editor's Note: RESPA was
amended by Pub. L. No. 94-205, 89 Stat. 1157 (Jan. 2, 1976), and the amendments
were incorporated into Regulation X by 41 Fed. Reg. 1672 (Jan. 9, 1976).]
139. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Supp. 1975-76).
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v. Specht 140 as being inapplicable to real estate transactions, was amended
by the Sixty-fourth Legislature so that real estate transactions would clearly
be within the Act's coverage. 141 However, the legislature also amended the
"Home Solicitation Transactions" chapter 14 2 of subtitle 3, article 5069 of the
Texas Revised Civil Statutes (often referred to as the Consumer Protection
Act), to exclude from the statute's coverage any sale of realty occurring in a
residence other than the existing residence of the consumer. 143 Prior to the
amendment, the statute might have included a residential sales transaction
where the consumer-purchaser and the seller negotiated the sale at the
seller's residence. Finally, the Federal Fair Housing Act 1 44 was reviewed
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States
v. Northside Realty Associates,1 45 the third appellate decision in the same
litigation, with the court en banc vigorously confirming again to the defendant that the latter had violated the Act and, thus, had properly been enjoined
from further violations.
HI.

FINANCING AND DEVELOPMENT

Article 5069-1.07. The 1974 Property Article contained an extensive
analysis of 1973 legislation which, although vetoed by Governor Briscoe and,
therefore, never enacted, represented a serious attempt by the Texas Legislature to adapt interest statutes to current necessities in real estate transactions.'14 In 1975 the Sixty-fourth Legislature passed, and Governor Briscoe
signed into law, article 5069-1.0 7,147 a statute drafted with essentially the
same substantive terms as the ill-fated 1973 version. Divided into two
separate and essentially unrelated sections, article 5069-1.07 attempts to
ameliorate the impact of usury laws on real estate transactions (a) by
solidifying by statutory recognition the concept of "spreading" front-end
interest and interest in advance for "any loan or agreement to loan secured
or to be secured, in whole or in part, by a lien, mortgage, security interest, or
other interest in or with respect to any interest in real property,"' 48 and (b)
by increasing from ten percent per annum to the corporate rate 1 49 the
140. 525 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
141. See TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(1) (Supp. 1975-76) which now
defines "goods" as "tangible chattels or real property purchased or leased for use."
142. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-13.01 to -13.06 (Supp. 1975-76).
143. Id. art. 5069-13.01(5) (Supp. 1975-76).
144. Fair Housing Act (title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968), 42 U.S.C. § 360131 (1970).
145. 518 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1975).
146. Wallenstein (1974) at 42-45.
147. TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07 (Supp. 1975-76).
148. Id. art. 5069-1.07(a). As explained in an excellent recent student analysis, the
term "interest in advance" generally denotes "interest actually paid before the borrower
has had the use of the borrowed funds for the time period for which such interest is
charged" and the term "front-end interest" generally denotes "a fee or charge, received
by the lender, in consideration for the loan of money, at the inception of the loan."
Comment, Usury Implications of Front-End Interest and Interest in Advance, 29 Sw.
L.J. 748, 750-51 (1975). See also Comment, Usury in Texas: Spreading Interest over
the Entire Period of the Loan, 12 Hous. L. REV. 159 (1974).
149. TEX. REV.CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Supp. 1975-76) permits the rate of
interest in certain loans to corporations (not including charitable and religious corporations) to reach "one and one-half percent (1%%) per month" without creating a
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maximum contractual interest rate "on any loan in the principal amount of
$500,000 or more, which is made for the purpose of interim financing for
construction on real property or financing or refinancing of improved real
property."' 150 As may be indicated by the quoted excerpts in the immediately preceding sentence, the language of article 5069-1.07 will quite likely
be the subject of frequent consternation-and possibly litigation-both with
regard to solidifying the concept of "spreading"''
and with regard to
revising the maximum contractual rate for specified transactions. 1 2 Moreusurious transaction.

Whether the rate of "one and one-half percent (11/2%)

per

month" restricts lenders more than 18% per annum has been the subject of concern to
those analyzing article 1302-2.09. See Wallenstein (1974) at 47 n.134.
150. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(b) (Supp. 1975-76).
151. The problem areas of article 5069-1.07(a) which the authors of this Article have
discerned as of this date include the following: (1) Does the language of the statute, as
quoted in the text of this Article, permit the statute to be applied to loans secured by a
partnership interest in a real estate syndication? (2) Does the savings clause in the
statute itself require the refunding of unearned excess interest in the event of a voluntary
prepayment, thus reversing established case law? See Gulf Coast Inv. Corp. v. Prichard,
348 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); A.Y. Creager Co. v.
Horton, 96 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1936, no writ). (3) Does the statute's
restriction to real estate loan situations create a presumption that "spreading" is not
authorized for loans not relating to real estate? (4) Because the statute requires
spreading "during the period of the full stated term of the loan" is it applicable to loans
due "on demand, or if no demand be made, then on [a stated date]"? (5) Does the
statute permit "spreading" of interest on the full stated amount of the loan, even when
the transaction involves front-end interest, thus reversing established case law that the
interest rate for usury determinations must be computed on the net amount actually
disbursed by the lender (i.e., after deducting front-end interest)? See Imperial Corp. of
America v. Frenchman's Creek Corp., 453 F.2d 1338, 1346 (5th Cir. 1972); Nevels v.
Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 195, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1049 (1937). (6) Because the statute
requires the "amortizing, prorating, allocating, and spreading, in equal parts [emphasis
added] during the period of the full stated term of the loan, all interest at any time
contracted for, charged, or received," can the lender be placed in jeopardy in situations
of installment loans with level payments amortizing the principal to a low amount
towards the end of the loan? (7) And finally, will the statute fail a constitutional
challenge since, as has been pointed out in recent analysis, it may have removed any
effective ceiling on interest rates? See Comment, supra note 148, at 764-65.
With regard to the last four problem areas, article 5069-1.07(a) should not be
construed in a manner which would make it vulnerable to such claims. Instead, it should
be construed as permitting what the Amarillo court of civil appeals in 1924 correctly
alluded to as being the proper approach in calculations involving "interest in advance."
Instead of relying strictly on the stated terms of the loan documents, calculations should
be made to determine whether the effective yield throughout the stated term of the loan
is greater than the applicable maximum legal rate, such calculations to be as follows: (i)
any excess interest (i.e., over the maximum legal rate) charged in a particular year
should be treated as if it were a payment on the principal of the loan; (ii) any excess
uncharged interest (i.e., the difference between the full amount of interest permitted
under the maximum legal rate minus interest actually charged) in a particular year
should be treated as an increase of the principal of the loan; and (iii) the court should
then determine under this method whether in the last term of the loan the interest
charged exceeds the maximum amount permitted (in which event the effective yield over
the entire loan term would be greater than the applicable maximum legal rate). See
Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 266 S.W. 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1924), rev'd, 120 Tex. 400, 30 S.W.2d 282 (1930), discussed in Note, Usury in Texas:
Spreading Interest Over the Entire Period of the Loan, 12 Hous. L. REV. 158, 163-67
(1974). The basis for the supreme court's reversal in Shropshire, the absence of a
savings clause protecting the borrower in the event of prepayment or acceleration, has
been resolved in article 5069-1.07(a); therefore, the emphasis on effective yield can and
should be adopted by Texas courts in order to bring usury law in line both with the
inescapable logic of such approach (judging the legality of the stated loan terms by
comparison to the maximum effective yield if the loan documents were restated) and
with the realities of lending practices (where most lending institutions and developers
compute effective yield regardless of how the loan is characterized in its stated terms).
152. The problem areas of article 5069-1.07(b) which the authors of this Article have
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over, inasmuch as the bill enacting article 5069-1.07 provided that it "does
not have any application to any right or duty, contract, obligation, cause of
action, or claim of defense arising prior to its effective date,"'1 53 the new
statutory provisions may not be effective as to loans after September .1,
1975, which were committed prior to September 1, 1975,154 and as to
renewals after September 1, 1975, of loans originally made prior to that
date. 155
Usury Cases; Miscellaneous Legislation and Rulings. In Skeen v. Glenn
Justice Mortgage Co.150 and American Century Mortgage Investors v.
Regional Center, Ltd. 157 the Dallas court of civil appeals brought the

current state of Texas usury law in line with the most sophisticated appellate
decisions of any other state,' 58 by validating loans made to corporations
formed exclusively to qualify the prospective borrower for a higher rate of
interest.1 59 In Skeen the court held that a lender may require a prospective
discerned as of this date, in addition to the one indicated in footnote 149 supra, are as
follows: (1) Does the language of the statute, as quoted in the text of this Article,
exclude a $550,000 construction loan commitment if the first advance is less than
$500,000 (an especially complicated question if the loan documents contain contingencies for full funding, such as optional construction costs or rental requirements)? (2) Is
a $1,000,000 business rehabilitation loan excluded when less than $500,000 of the loan is
secured by the company's real estate holdings? (3) Does the requirement that the interim
financing be "for construction on real property" exclude a $550,000 loan where more
than $50,000 is allocated for the purchase of unimproved land upon which the borrower
will expend less than $500,000 in the construction of improvements? (4) What improvements are necessary to qualify the loan as a "financing or refinancing of improved real
property"? (Emphasis added.) With regard to the last problem area, an impressive
outline presented to the University of Texas School of Law Mortgage Lending Institute,
Sept. 25, 1975, by Frank F. Smith, Jr., attorney at law, Houston, Texas, draws analogies
to the following sources: (a) Regulation 8.1 (A) of the Texas Savings & Loan Comm'n;
(b) Nat'l Banking Act Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 220(e) (1975); (c) Texas case law:
Reynolds v. State, 390 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1965, no writ); Texas
Power & Light Co. v. Lovinggood, 389 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Mallet Land & Cattle Co. v. State, 84 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1935), rev'd on other grounds, 126 Tex. 392, 88 S.W.2d 471 (1935); and (d)
judicial decisions from other states. See, e.g., Builders Land Co. v. Martens, 255 Iowa
231, 122 N.W.2d 189 (1963).
153. Ch. 26, § 3, [1975] Tex. Laws 47 (emphasis added).
154. If a loan commitment is dated before Sept. 1, 1975, and if it merely gives an
option to the prospective borrower to consummate a loan after such date (without any
requirement that he consummate the loan), then no "contract" for payment of interest
has "arisen" prior to the effective date of the statute. Unfortunately, lenders, in their
zeal to bind prospective borrowers to a loan commitment, often document it in such a
way that the option nature of the contract is overshadowed by language denoting a
bilateral loan agreement. See Draper, The Broken Commitment: A Modern View of the
Mortgage Lender's Remedy, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 418 (1974); cf. Draper, Tight Money
and Possible Substantive Defenses to Enforcement of Future Mortgage Commitments, 50
NOTRE DAME LAW. 603 (1975); Wolf, The Refundable Commitment Fee, 23 Bus. LAw.
1065 (1968).
155. See Cherry v. Berg, 508 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no
writ) (renewal promissory notes tainted with usury of original note).
156. 526 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ), noted in 29 Sw. L.J.
959 (1975).
157. 529 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
158. The superior conceptual analysis of the instant problem is that generally referred
to as "the New York rule." See Leader v. Dinkler Management Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 393,
230 N.E.2d 120, 283 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1967). But note that "the New York rule" is not
without limitation even in the State of New York. Buoninfante v. Hoffman, 48 App.
Div. 678, 367 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1975) (citing other recent cases).
159. See note 149 supra. See also Comment, Incorporation to Avoid the Usury
Laws, 68 CoLUM. L. REv. 1390 (1968); Comment, Using a "Dummy" Corporate
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borrower to incorporate, even though the lender knows that usury considerations are the sole reason for incorporation. The court did not address itself
directly to the effect of the "corporate" borrower's being a mere sham or
"dummy" corporation representing the de facto non-corporate developer
because no issue in connection with that question had been presented to the
trial court. 160 However, in finding that the affidavit which was presented to
the trial court "states no facts, or even conclusions, which indicate that the
corporation was created as a cloak or cover for a fraudulent or illegal
transaction,"'' the court by necessity held that the lender's requirement of
a corporate borrower did not of itself permit any presumption that the lender
had participated in a sham transaction. This implied holding in Skeen was
embellished in the American Century case, in which the de facto noncorporate borrower had set up a "dummy" corporate entity solely as a
subterfuge for the purpose of evading the ten percent usury rate for noncorporate borrowers and with full intent that ownership and control of the
property securing the loan would remain in the actual non-corporate borrower. Acknowledging that a subterfuge had been created by the borrower in
order to obtain its loan, and further acknowledging by implication that the
lender may have had reason to know of the subterfuge (or at least ample
opportunity to discover it upon reasonable investigation), the court nevertheless validated the loan because of the absence of a finding that "the lender
participatedin or had actual knowledge of the subterfuge."' 162 The enormous importance of the Skeen and American Century cases can perhaps be
appreciated fully only by attorneys whose lending clients have elected to
adopt a "hear no evil; see no evil; speak no evil" approach in dealing with
purported corporate borrowers (and perhaps by attorneys whose developer
clients hope, for purposes of preserving their individual tax deductions, that
their lenders will adopt such an approach' 6 3 ); however, the court's obvious
inclination in cases of this nature-to avoid penalizing a lender for entering
an eager and astute borrowerinto a complex financial transaction 6with
4
should have a rather universal appeal.1
In another significant case pairing, Wagner v. Austin Savings & Loan
Ass'n'6 5 and Freeman v. Gonzales County Savings & Loan Ass'n,166 two
Borrower Creates Usury and Tax Difficulties, 28 Sw. L.J. 437 (1974). With regard to
the tax aspects of such transactions see Collins v. United States, 514 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir.
1975), a/f'g 386 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ga. 1974). Cf. Rev. Rul. 75-31, 1975 Irrr. REv. BULL.
No. 4, at 6.
160. The appellate court was reviewing a summary judgment rendered in substantial
reliance on affidavits submitted by each party.
161. Skeen v. Glenn Justice Mortgage Co., 526 S.W.2d 252, 256 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1975, no writ) (emphasis added).
162. American Century Mortgage Investors v. Regional Center, Ltd., 529 S.W.2d 578,
583 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (emphasis added).
163. See note 159 supra.
164. In light of former Justice Douglas' recommendations that law review authors
disclose business interests which may affect their conclusions, Douglas, Law Reviews and
Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REv. 227 (1965), the authors of this Article wish to point
out, with respect to their conclusions accompanying this and the immediately preceding
footnotes, that their law practice includes representation of both real estate lenders and
real estate developers.
165. 525 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ).
166. 526 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ granted).
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courts of civil appeals reached different conclusions as to whether the special
statutory provision for savings and loan association loans' 67 exempts frontend interest from usury regulation. The court in Wagner, reviewing a frontend charge labeled as "points," reached an affirmative conclusion that the
exemption was applicable.' 68 However, in a situation involving a front-end
charge labeled as a "loan fee," the Freeman decision implied a negative
conclusion. 16 9 For reasons already amply discussed in a recent student
article, 170 it is doubtful whether savings and loan associations should rely on
171
the Wagner approach.
The case of Moore v. Sabine National Bank'7 2 should serve as a warning
to lenders that demand letters must not overstate the interest due as of the
demand date. In the Moore case, which reviewed the penalty provisions of
the Texas Consumer Credit Code, 173 the court refused to allow the lender to
revoke its erroneous demand for unlawful interest, holding that by sending
the demand itself-though not permitted by the terms of the loan instruments-the lender had violated the statutory proscription against "charging"
excessive interest.
Several other cases of lesser significance were decided during the survey
year,' 74 and a new chapter was added to the Texas Consumer Credit
167. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 5.07 (1964), which provides in relevant
part that savings and loan associations "may charge premiums for making such [i.e., real
estate] loans" and that such premiums "shall not be deemed a part of the interest
collected or agreed to be paid on such loans."
168. "[We hold that such 'points' are not interest within the usury statutes." Wagner
v. Austin Say. & Loan Ass'n, 525 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, no
writ).
169. For some reason the court did not face the issue squarely. Instead, it labeled
the "loan fee" as interest, after discussing only whether it might be a "reasonable
expense" of the type permitted by the statute (in addition to "premiums"). The court
also failed in another definitional aspect of its opinion, confusing the "loan fee" in the
case with a "commitment fee" which is not interest but, rather, a fee for the borrower's
option to consummate a loan on or before a future date. See Wallenstein (1974) at 43
n. 116. However, this aspect of the court's opinion has been accepted for review by the
supreme court in its granting of writ of error. 19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 136 (Jan. 24, 1976).
170. Comment, supra note 148, at 758-59 n.80.
171. Even the Wagner court indicated its concern by noting in its opinion: "Plaintiffs
make no constitutional challenge of this statute and the meaning thereof is clearly
dispositive of the contention now advanced by plaintiffs." Wagner v. Austin Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 525 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ).
172. 527 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
173. TEX. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-8.01-.02 (1971). As pointed out by the
court in the Moore decision, however, the relevant provisions in the general usury
penalty statute, id. art. 5069-1.06, are essentially the same.
174. Crow v. Home Sav. Ass'n, 522 S4W.2d 457 (Tex. 1975) (facts of case did not
warrant jury's finding that transaction in question, triangular loan involving borrower
and two lending institutions, was a "device" for accomplishing usurious loan); Hurley v.
National Bank of Commerce, 529 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (recovery in suit for usurious payments made more than two years prior to suit
was barred by limitation provision of 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1970)); Pinemont Bank v. Du
Croz, 528 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(maximum forfeiture which could be awarded on allegedly usurious note was twice the
usurious interest, even though several parties signed note); Wall v. East Texas Teachers
Credit Union, 526 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975), rev'd, 19 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 181 (Feb. 11, 1976) (party need not specifically plead usury where note is usurious on its face); Freeman v. Hernandez, 521 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975,
no writ) (note usurious on its face was not subject to reformation in absence of any
mistake or ignorance of usury laws); Johns v. Jaeb, 518 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1974, no writ) (alleged partnership contribution was in fact a loan in violation
of the usury laws).
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Code175 in an effort to coordinate state crpdit law with the Federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act. 170 'Finally, the Attorney General of Texas
rendered an opinion 1 77 which expressly held the corporate usury rate
inapplicable in the case of a loan to a partnership composed solely of two
corporations, but which left unanswered the question of whether the corporate usury rate would be applicable in case of a loan to the two corporations
severally.
Article 3810. In response to recent constitutional assaults upon non-judicial
foreclosure sales' 78 the Sixty-fourth Legislature amended article 3810 to
require a foreclosing mortgagee to send written notice of the proposed
foreclosure sale at least twenty-one days prior to sale to "each debtor
obligated to pay such debt according to the records of such holder."' 79 The
amendment also dispenses with the previous requirement of two public
postings in addition to the one at the county courthouse of the county in
which the land is located. The new statute, while probably not subject to
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 80 does provide notice
more in keeping with the United States Supreme Court decision of Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.'8 1 than its predecessor. However,
the new statute also raises certain additional dangers which may not be
apparent from a cursory reading. First, as to deeds of trust executed before
the effective date of the statute, 8 2 the deed of trust provision granting the
power of sale may contain contractual requirements tracking the language of
the old statute. It would, therefore, be prudent for anyone attempting to
conduct a non-judicial foreclosure to comply with the notice requirements of
both the old statute and the amended statute, especially in light of the strict
scrutiny given to non-judicial foreclosures. 8 3 Second, the language "each
175. TEX. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-14.01 to -14.24 (Supp. 1975-76).
176. Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (Supp. IV,
1970).
177. TEx. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. H-589 (1975).
178. See, e.g., Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975);
Hoffman v. HUD, 519 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1975); Bryant v. Jefferson Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 509 F,2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250
(W.D.N.C. 1975); Garner v. Tri-State Dev. Co., 382 F. Supp., 377 (E.D. Mich. 1974);
Leisure Estates of America, Inc. v. Carmel Dev. Co., 371 F. Supp. 556 (S.D. Tex.
1974); Armenta v. Nussbaum, 519 S W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally Comment, ProceduralDue Process: For Sale in Texas
to the Highest Bidder?, 10 Hous. L. REv. 880, 894-96 (1973); Comment, Due Process
Evolution-Fuentes and the Deed of Trust, 26 Sw. L.J. 876 (1972); Comment, Nonjudicial Foreclosure Under a Deed of Trust: Some Problems of Notice, 49 TEXAs L. REV.
1085 (1971).
179. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3810 (Supp. 1975-76).
180. See cases discussed in text accompanying note 184 infra.
181. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). In Mullane notice by publication was held insufficient in
the absence of a reasonable attempt of notification by mail. The Court held that to
comply with the requirements of due process, notice must be given in the way most likely
to give the other party actual notice. Assuming arguendo that the requisite state action
was present, then the due process clause would require the trustee to mail notice to the
debtor rather than merely posting in three public places.
182. Section 2 of the 1975 amendatory act revising art. 3810 provided: "This Act
shall become effective on January 1, 1976, and it shall apply only to sales made after
that date." Ch. 723, § 2, [1975] Tex. Laws 2354.
183. See, e.g., Winters v. Slover, 151 Tex. 485, 251 S.W.2d 726 (1952); Faine v.
Wilson, 192 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1946, no writ).
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debtor obligated to pay such debt" leaves unclear whether or not guarantors
are within the class who are entitled to notice. The authors of this Article
feel that guarantors probably are so entitled and that to avoid the possible
discharge of the guarantors or the setting aside of the sale, a prudent trustee
should send notice to each guarantor. Third, the statute requires that if
notice is to be deemed effected as of the date of posting, it must be sent to a
"debtor" at his "most recent address as shown by the records of the holder of
the debt"; therefore, attorneys who represent their lending clients in foreclosure proceedings must check carefully with their clients to determine the
"most recent address."
Several recent cases 1 84 have apparently settled the question of whether
article 3810 involves state action sufficient to subject it to the due process
requirements of the fourteenth amendment. 'Probably the most extensively
documented of these decisions is Judge Wisdom's analysis in the Fifth
Circuit's case, Barrera v. Security Building & Investment Corp.185 In that
case the court first distinguished action under article 3810 from those with
direct involvement of the state, as found in Fuentes v. Shevin, 1 86 D.H.
Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co.,1 87 Swarb v. Lennox, 18 and Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp.,'8 9 since under article 3810 no agent of the state is
vested with any power and none has any obligatory function. 190 The court
did recognize that the power of sale ultimately relies on the state's acknowledgment of the transfer of title, but concluded that to equate such acknowledgment with state action would result in virtually all private arrangements
being subject to the due process clause. The court quickly disposed of the
debtor's argument that the statute constitutes "significant state involvement"
by noting that the state neither authorizes the power of sale nor codifies the
right to contract for and to exercise that power; rather the statute merely
restricts the exercise of those powers.' 9' Relying on its decision in James v.
184. Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975); Hoffman
v. HUD, 371 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1975);
Leisure Estates of America v. Carmel Dev. Co., 371 F. Supp. 556 (S.D. Tex. 1974);
Carmel v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, Civ. No. CA-3-7158-L (N.D. Tex. 1973); Criss
v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, Civ. No. CA-3-7044-E (M.D. Tex. 1975); Armenta v.
Nussbaum, 519 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See
also cases cited in notes 190, 196 infra.
185. 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975).
186. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
187. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
188. 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
189. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
190. But cf. Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975). The
applicable foreclosure statute vested the clerk with administration of upset bid provisions,
approval of the disposition of the proceeds of sale, as well as the explicit verification of
the essentials of the sale. The court characterized the procedure as "a streamlined
version of a judicial sale, with the clerk exercising by detailed statutory authority many
of the supervisory powers inherent in a court of equity." Id. at 1258.
191. This distinction is the crux of the state action question in self-help remedy
statutes-whether the statute is permissive (i.e., authorizing certain conduct) or whether
the statute is restrictive (iLe., restricting the manner of conduct which would be
permissible in the absence of the statute). However, those reviewing the wording of
questionable statutes should review the statute as a whole, and in context with common
law rules, instead of relying exclusively on whether the statute is couched in permissive
or restrictive language.
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Pinnix,192 the court then noted that the mere fact that a state has sought to

regulate an activity does not in itself constitute state action. Finally, the
court rejected the debtor's argument that foreclosure by sale is a judicial
function, noting that non-judicial foreclosure under a power of sale in a deed
1 93
of trust has been used and recognized for more than one hundred years.
The court in dictum noted that it did not mean to imply approval of the
omission from the statute of any requirement of personal notice to the
debtor, but that in the absence of state action, this was a matter for the state
94
courts and legislatures.1
Similarly, in Armenta v. Nussbaum'9 5 a state court held that article 3810
did not involve "significant state action"'196 but rather was enacted for the
protection of the debtor to curb abuses in the use of the power of sale
provisions. The court analogized the article to UCC section 9-503, citing
the fact that six federal circuits have sustained the constitutionality of the
section on a finding of insufficient state action to raise the due process
question. 1 97 The court concluded that for it to strike down the statute
would leave the debtor with less protection than he presently enjoys.
Mortgages. While it is a well-established principle that a foreclosure sale
will not be voided merely because the property was sold for a price well
below fair market value, 198 three cases decided during the survey demonstrated that grossly inadequate prices will not be tolerated if there is even a
slight irregularity in the sale. For example, in Crow v. Heath' 99 the court
noted that a $5,000 bid on property later sold by the bidder for $28,675 was
grossly inadequate. The court then held that the standard notice of a
trustee's sale is not sufficient notice to the debtor to make operative an
optional acceleration clause 200 and that such absence of proper notice, when
coupled with the inadequacy of the consideration, would be sufficient to set
192. 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974).
193. See, e.g., Hipp v. Hutchett, 4 Tex. 20 (1849). The court in Barrera distinguished Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970), which had held a landlord's lien
statute unconstitutional on the grounds that prior to the enactment of the statute, Texas
had not recognized such a self-help remedy.
194. For an analysis of action by the Texas Legislature, see footnotes 178-83 supra
and accompanying text.
195. 519 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
196. Accord, Bryan v. Jefferson Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Coffey Enterprises Realty & Dev. Co. v. Holmes, 213 S.E.2d 882 (Ga. 1975);
Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. 1975).
197. 519 S.W.2d at 678, citing e.g., James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974).
198. A bid of only 7.4% of the property value was held to be sufficient in American
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Musick, 19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 105 (Dec. 17, 1975), rev'g 517 S.W.2d
627 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974), where the court found no irregularity in the sale. See Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Elledge, 463 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.
1972) (sales price was barely more than one-third the alleged fair market value);
Mitchell v. Foster, 492 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(sales price was barely more than one-half the alleged fair market value). See also
Tarrant Say. Ass'n v. Lucky Homes, Inc., 390 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex. 1965) (the
Supreme Court of Texas repeated the general rule that "mere inadequacy of consideration alone [a $1,200 purchase price when the alleged value of the property was $4,000]
does not render a foreclosure sale void if the sale was legally and fairly made.").
199. 516 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
200. See Lockwood v. Lisby, 476 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the sale aside. 20 1 And, in Phillips v. Latham202 a court held that a bid of
$691.43 for property worth at least $12,500 was so grossly inadequate that
the purchaser was estopped from asserting that he was a good faith
purchaser for value; 20 3 therefore, payments by the debtor to the original
creditor were effective as against an assignee if made in good faith and
without notice of the assignment. 20 4 Similarly, in an execution sale where
the bid was only two percent of the value of the property and the judgment
lien debtor had no notice of either the levy or the sale, the sale was set
aside. 20 5 On the other hand, as was shown in American Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. Musick,20 where the trustee is an officer of the beneficiary a strict
adherence to the literal language of the deed of trust for appointment of a
substitute trustee may not be required even in a low bid situation. The
Texas Supreme Court held that even though the deed of trust did not
20 7
mention resignation as a ground for appointment of a substitute trustee,
the trustee's resignation constituted a refusal to act even though no request to
act had been made of the trustee. Finally, as demonstrated in Ross v.
Brown, 20 8 only those who are injured can complain of the inadequacy of the
consideration despite evidence that an irregularity at the sale was responsible
for the low price. 20 9 Another aspect of the Ross case was the court's
application of the equitable doctrine of subrogation. The court held that
where the third party had paid off the recorded lien it succeeded to the rights
of the lienholder and, therefore, had an equitable lien on the property for
210
that amount.
201. See Tarrant Say. Ass'n v. Lucky Homes, Inc., 390 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. 1965);
Crow v. Davis, 435 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
202. 523 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
203. Accord, Nichols-Steuart v. Crosby, 87 Tex. 443, 453, 29 S.W. 380, 382 (1895);
Hume v. Ware, 87 Tex. 380, 383, 28 S.W. 935, 936 (1894); cf. Hopper v. Tancil, 3
S.W.2d 67, 70 (Tex. Comm'n App.-1928, jdgmt adopted).
204. Accord, Olshan Lumber Co. v. Bullard, 395 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston 1965, no writ).
205. Pantaze v. Slocum, 518 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
206. 19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 105 (Dec. 19, 1975).
207. In the discussed case the deed of trust also failed to contain the common "for
any other reason" language as grounds for the appointment of a substitute trustee.
208. 396 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Tex. 1975).
209. In the reported case land worth $7,500 was sold at execution for $100 but
neither the judgment debtor nor the creditor complained; rather, a third party who had
paid off a prior lien subsequent to the judgment sought to have the sale set aside.
However, the third party's own witness had testified that the land was worth less than
the judgment so the possibility of the land's being worth more than the judgment was
considered by the court as being too remote to set the sale aside. Id. at 195-96.
210. Normally an equitable lien does not arise where the grantee pays off an
underlying indebtedness encumbering the property. Rather the lien arises to prevent
unfairness according to the general rules of equity. A common situation is an implied
vendor's lien where none has been reserved and where there is no deed of trust in favor
of the vendor. The Ross case presents a rather unique factual situation in which the
court found the equitable lien doctrine applicable. Cf. Hurt v. Read, 108 F.2d 282 (5th
Cir. 1939); Harrison v. First Nat'l Bank, 238 S.W. 209 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922,
jdgmt adopted); McDermott v. Steck Co., 138 S.W.2d 1106 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1940, writ ref'd); Ricketts v. Alliance Life Ins. Co., 135 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.); Meador v. Wagner, 70 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1934, writ dism'd); 53 TEx. JuR. 2d Subrogation § 41 (1964). See also
Murphy v. Smith, 50 S.W. 1040 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899).
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The case of Vaughn v. Crown Plumbing & Sewer Service, Inc. 211
involved an action by an owner to enjoin a foreclosure sale by its mortgagee.
In that case the mortgagee had for several months accepted mortgage
payments even though tendered a few days late; however, in one particular
month the mortgagee without prior warning sent notice of acceleration on the
fourth day of the month when the mortgage payment had not been received.
The following day the owner tendered a cashier's check in the amount of the
monthly installment, but the mortgagee refused to accept it. The court held
that the mortgagee's past practice in accepting late payments created an issue
as to whether he had waived his optional right of acceleration with respect to
installments subsequently coming due, absent some notice that short delays
212
were objectionable and that future installments should be timely paid.
An additional issue considered by the Vaughn court, and one apparently of
first impression in this state, was the mortgagee's claim that the mortgage
(which had been executed by the owner's predecessor and which contained a
"future-advance" clause 213) secured the payment of another note executed
by the predecessor to the mortgagee after the date of the sale to the owner,
and that the predecessor's default under this second note constituted a legal
basis for foreclosure under the deed of trust. Without citing any authority,
the court held that although the mortgage may have placed the owner on
notice of debts incurred by its predecessor prior to the sale in which the
owner obtained the property, it was certainly not notice of a note executed
after the date of the sale; therefore, the "future advance" clause was
214
ineffective as to such later debts.
211. 523 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

212. Accord, Miller v. A-OK Motel Inc., 511 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1974, no writ). See also Diamond v. Hodges, 58 S.W.2d 187, 188 (Tex. Civ.

App.-Dallas 1933, no writ) quoting San Antonio Real Estate Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Stewart, 94 Tex. 441, 447, 61 S.W. 386, 389 (1901).
213. This clause, sometimes also referred to as a "dragnet" clause, recites that the

deed of trust secures the payment of all other indebtedness (including future indebted-

ness) of the mortgagor/maker of the note or, sometimes less precisely, of any mortgagor
of the property to the mortgagee.

214. Three general comments may be helpful to the understanding of "future-

advance" or "dragnet" clauses.

First, Texas, like most other states, recognizes that a

mortgage can secure both contemporaneous advances and future advances, when the

future advances are clearly contemplated by the original loan documents. See generally
3 G. GLENN, MORTGAGES §§ 392-400.1 (1943); 3 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 442

(1974).
Second, Texas, like most other states, will not recognize a blatant "dragnet clause" if
the future advance was not "reasonably within the contemplation of the parties to the
mortgage at the time it was made." Wood v. Parker Square State Bank, 400 S.W.2d 898
(Tex. 1966). See also Moss v. Hipp, 387 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1965). However, Texas
does appear to have a rather lenient interpretation of "reasonably within the contemplation of the parties." See Estes v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 462 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1970).
Unfortunately, the Court in the Estes decision did not discuss its prior Wood decision
and thereby missed an opportunity to lay down guidelines; nevertheless, the peculiar facts
in the Wood decision and the fact that it preceded the Estes decision strongly suggest
that an attorney representing a borrower or a purchaser of land encumbered by a
"dragnet" mortgage might well ignore the former case entirely.
Third, Texas appears to be in the minority of states which give priority to an original
mortgage even when, after a junior mortgage attaches to the property, the original
mortgagee makes an optional future advance (which, of course, must still have been
"reasonably within contemplation" per the second consideration above). The most
concise general statement of this consideration is found at 3 G. GLENN, supra, §§ 401-02.
But see Annot., 138 A.L.R. 566 (1942), for a more thorough treatment. Note especially
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In Furman v. Sanchez215 the court, extending the holding of Pearce v.
Stokes 216 to cover executory land sales contracts, held that upon death of
the intestate vendee the vendee's equitable rights, title, and interests in the
property could not be cancelled without an administration of the deceased's
estate or the expiration of the statutory period in which an administration

could be ordered. Thus, even though no administration was taken out for
almost two years, during which period none of the delinquent installment

payments were paid, and despite the ultimate administrator's knowledge of
the delinquency, a subsequent sale to a new vendee was set aside. To one
who is unfamiliar with the Texas Probate Code, the Furman case may
appear to place vendors and mortgagees in a helpless situation. However,
section 76 of the Probate Code allows any "interested person" to make an
application for the appointment of an administrator, and under section 3(r)
interested person includes "creditors, or any others having a property right in
or claim against, the estate. 12 17 Therefore, a vendor or mortgagee can
request that administration be taken out at an earlier date.

An example of debtor delay tactics in foreclosure contests is found in
Riverdrive Mall, Inc. v. Larwin Mortgage Investors,218 where the court,

after assuming without deciding that article 1823219 empowers the court to
grant an injunction without requiring a bond, held that the equities of the
case required the posting of a bond in the granting of an injunction to enjoin
and to restrain the substitute trustee from conducting a foreclosure sale prior
to the disposition of the appeal. And the case of Pendleton Green Associates v. Anchor Savings Bank 220 demonstrates the potential delay value of
pp. 576-77 of the annotation which discuss the "minority doctrine" of optional future
advances. A recent analysis of Texas law in this area was undertaken by the court of
civil appeals in the Wood case discussed above. See Wood v. Parker Square State Bank,
390 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1956), rev'd, 400 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. 1966).
It appears significant that although the supreme court reversed the court of civil appeals
in that case, it did not challenge "the Frieberg rule" of optional future advances (i.e., the
Texas rule, based upon the holding in Frieberg v. Magale, 70 Tex. 116, 7 S.W. 684
(1888)) which the lower court had followed (with some reluctance, as shown in the last
paragraph of the decision of the lower court). Instead, the supreme court reversed on
the applicability of the "dragnet clause" and, in fact, seemed to add modem respectability
to the nineteenth century Frieberg case by citing it favorably and then merely distinguishing it on the facts of the Wood case. See also Coke Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 529 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd) (citing Frieberg
as authority for its holding that a deed of trust to secure future advances, if filed prior to
a materialman's lien, has priority even with respect to advances made with actual notice
of the materialman's lien); Crabb v. William Cameron & Co., 63 S.W.2d 367, 368 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted); Poole v. Cage, 214 S.W. 500, 502 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1919, writ ref'd).
215. 523 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ).
216. 155 Tex. 564, 291 S.W.2d 309 (1956). The Texas Supreme Court held that a
sale of realty made under a deed of trust after the death of a grantor does not pass title
pending administration. Accord, Cole v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 93 F.2d 620 (5th Cir.
1937); American Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Jones, 482 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
217. TEX. PROB. CoDE ANN. §§ 3(r), 76 (1956).
218. 515 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
219. TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 1823 (1964). The statute gives the court the
power to grant a temporary injunction to preserve the subject matter of the litigation
pending appeal from an order by the trial court denying a temporary injunction. See
generally Sales & Cliff, Jurisdiction in the Texas Supreme Court and Courts of Civil
Appeals, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 501, 535 (1974).
220. 520 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ).
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an appeal from an order denying the debtor's request for a temporary
injunction to restrain a foreclosure sale. Although the debtors in this case
lost in both the trial and appellate courts, their procedural tactics caused at
least a three-month delay of the foreclosure sale.

At least two aspects of Pine v. Gibraltar Savings Ass'n 221 are worthy of
note. First, the case should provide to those developers seeking loan
commitments the caveat as to the required specificity of the commitment in
order for it to be enforceable as a binding contract. Second, the court held
that water and sewer lines not included in the loan security were appurtenances to the property foreclosed upon and title to them passed to the

mortgagee upon foreclosure. 222 Finally, the court in Associates Financial
Services of Texas, Inc. v. Solomon 223 held that a landlord's lien perfected
prior to the filing of a financing statement was superior to a purchase money
security interest. Quoting from the "Secured Transactions" section of Texas
Jurisprudence2d, the court reiterated that "if the security interest is perfected with respect to the property after it is on the premises the landlord's lien
should be superior. '224 The statement seems to stand for the proposition
that a landlord's lien will be superior regardless of whether he perfects before
the filing or perfection by the creditor as long as the creditor fails to perfect
by the time the personal property is placed on the premises.
Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens. The 1974 supreme court decision in
First National Bank v. Whirlpool Corp.225 was followed during the survey
221. 519 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
The court held that a construction loan commitment providing that the lender would lend
the developer at "prevailing market rates" and "industry standards" any moneys needed
within a three-year period to construct houses on certain specified lots (with the lender
reserving the right to reject any plans) constituted no more than an agreement to agree.
The court cited the absence of any agreement as to the total amount to be loaned, when
and how the principal was to be paid, when and how the interest was to be paid, the ratio
of loan to appraisal value, or when the loans would mature. With regard to the alleged
permanent loan commitment, the court found the lender's power to change the loan
premium and to turn down loans to potential home buyers to be fatal to enforceability.
In connection with the problems represented by this case, the authors of this Article have
been particularly impressed with the following observations voiced at a 1967 Practicing
Law Institute program in New York City:
Chairman Glassner [Herman M. Glassner, a well-known New York City
attorney and a co-chairman of the program]: I really felt after reading
the average commitment, and I have read many of them just as other
lawyers have drawn many, that there are many loopholes that would permit a lender to avoid the obligation. Perhaps in the final analysis the
commitment itself is worth no more than the name of the lender at the
top of the page. In other words, what one is doing in effect is relying on
the good faith of the lender to go through with the loan.
REAL ESTATE FINANCING: BUSINESS AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS § 4.29 (1968).
222. The question of what constitutes an appurtenance to realty is not an entirely
settled question. The court defined appurtenance to mean "all rights and interest in
other property necessary for the full enjoyment of the property conveyed and which were
used as necessary incidents thereto." 519 S.W.2d at 241. See also Hancox v. Peek, 355
S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
223. 523 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
224. Id. at 724, citing 51 TEX. JUR. 2d Secured Transactions § 265 (1970).
225. 517 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1974), discussed in Wallenstein (1975) at 48-49. The
supreme court held that with respect to the dishwashers and disposals which the supplier
had installed, but not with respect to the refrigerators and ranges, the supplier was
entitled to a mechanics' lien in preference to a prior-recorded mortgage. Inasmuch as
each disposal and dishwasher had been physically fastened to the adjacent wall, principally through the use of screws, the court found a sufficient incorporation in the realty to
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year in Houk Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Mortgage & Trust, Inc.,226 where the
court held that air conditioning and heating systems were incorporated into
the realty within the meaning of the mechanics' and materialmen's lien
statutes and the mechanics' and materialmen's liens perfected on such
equipment were superior to a prior recorded vendor's deed of trust lien
because the units could be removed from the structures without damage. A
contrary result followed the court's finding that cabinets which had been
installed could not be removed without damage to the real estate.
In Corpus Christi Bank & Trust v. Smith 22 7 the Texas Supreme Court
failed to find sufficient evidence to sustain the contention of subcontractors
and materialmen that they were entitled to contractual retainage funds as
third party beneficiaries under the construction contract.
In Red Henry Painting Co. v. Bank of North Texas 228 the court held that
article 5472e, 229 the trust fund provision, by its express terms applies only to
the recovery of funds under a construction contract for the improvement of
specific real property within the state and does not apply to general contracts
or to claims based upon quantum meruit.
23 0
In Da-Col Paint Manufacturing Co. v. American Indemnity Co.,
involving an action against a surety on a prime contractor's bond by the
supplier of a subcontractor, the Texas Supreme Court held that, where the
sham contractor statute2 3 1 is applicable, compliance with the notice requirements of article 5453232 can be met simply by notifying the owner.
Additionally, the court held that even though the subcontractor was elevated
by operation of law to the status of an original contractor, the supplier of the
subcontractor could still recover on the bond of the sham original contractor.
To deny recovery, reasoned the court, would be to the advantage of the
owner and sham contractor, thus defeating the purpose of the sham contrac233
tor statute.
Miscellaneous. In Plantation Foods, Inc. v. R.J. Regan Co. 23 4 the court,
give rise to the statutory mechanics' lien. However, no mechanics' lien was deemed
available with respect to the refrigerators and ranges since their only connection to the
realty was the plug into the electrical wall outlet.
226. 517 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Civ. Avp.-Waco 1974, no writ).
227. 525 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. 1975), rev'g in part 512 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1974). The appellate court decision along with several other cases dealing with the effect of Texas' mechanics' lien laws on voluntary protection contracted
for the benefit of subcontractors is discussed in Wallenstein (1975) at 51-52. See also
Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Texas & P. Ry., 136 Tex. 333, 150 S.W.2d 1003 (1941); Scarborough v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 250 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio
1952, writ ref'd).
228. 521 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ).
229. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5472e (Supp. 1975-76). The statute declares
funds borrowed for the improvement of real property to be trust funds. See Youngblood
Mechanics' and Materialmen'sLiens in Texas, 26 Sw. L.J. 665 (1972).
230. 517 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1974).

231. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5452-1 (Supp. 1975-76).
232. Id. art. 5453. The statute sets forth the general requirements for securing a lien,
including a requirement of notice to both the owner and the prime contractor.
233. Earlier cases denying recovery to materialmen of an original contractor based
upon the bond of another original contractor were distinguished since in those cases the
second original contractor became such by directly contracting with the owner and,
therefore, was not vulnerable to deception. 517 S.W.2d at 273.
234. 520 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
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while reciting the well-established principle that when parties to a building
contract agree to submit questions which may arise thereunder to the
decision of an architect or engineer, his decision is binding upon such parties
absent fraud, misconduct, or gross mistake implying bad faith or failure to
exercise honest judgment, failed to note the distinction between arbitration
and appraisement. 233 Whereas a provision for appraisement will be enforceable, a provision in an executory contract for arbitration will be
unenforceable as against public policy. 236
In a case of considerable tactical importance to real estate investment
trusts, Larwin Mortgage Investors v. Riverdrive Mall, Inc., 23 7 a federal district
court held that a real estate investment trust may not be treated as a
single entity for the purpose of determining the existence of federal diversity
jurisdiction, and that the citizenship of all holders of beneficial interests, not
that of the trustee, is determinative. The court noted that its order might
create a barrier to federal diversity jurisdiction of actions in which real estate
investment trust litigants are involved.
Lenders and developers are no doubt aware of the fact that since July 1,
1975, the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973238 has precluded federally
related financing assistance for acquisition of or construction on real estate
subject to special flood hazards unless the "community" is participating in
the national flood insurance program. 239 Guidelines for interpreting this
Act are available in the Federal Register. 240 Finally the new Equal Credit
Opportunity Act 241 now prohibits a lender from discriminating on the basis
of the sex or marital status of a credit applicant. Recent regulations
allowing the signature of a spouse only if "uniformly required," suggest that
in light of the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of marital status, the
term "uniformly required" may be interpreted to mean that if the lender
requires two signatures for a married borrower the lender must also require
two signatures if the person is single. A lender is permitted under an
exception in the statute to inquire as to the marital status of the credit
applicant if solely for purposes of "ascertaining the creditor's rights and
remedies applicable to the particular extension of credit. '242 This should
provide some relief to a lender who seeks to foreclose on a homestead or
other property in a community property jurisdiction such as Texas, where the
signatures of both spouses are necessary to convey the homestead.
235. But see Huntington Corp. v. Inwood Constr. Co., 348 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
236. For an excellent and comprehensive analysis of the Texas case law concerning arbitration see Tejas Dev. Co. v. McGough, Bros., 165 F.2d 276, 280 (5th
Cir. 1947). See also Carrington, The 1965 General Arbitration Statute of Texas, 20 Sw.
L.J. 21 (1966).

237. Civ. No. 74-L-23 (S.D. Tex., April 21, 1975).
238. Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-234, amending 42 U.S.C.
ch. 50 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1976)).
239. Id., 42 U.S.C. § 4106(a) (Supp. IV, 1970).
240. 39 Fed. Reg. 26186 (1974). For further information contact either the National Flood Insurers Ass'n, 160 Water Street, New York City, N.Y., 10038, telephone (212)
487-5661, the nearest HUD Regional Office, or the Federal Insurance Administration,
HUD, Washington, D.C., (202) 755-8872 or (800) 424-8873.
241. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (Supp. IV, 1970).
242. Id.
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LANDLORD-TENANT

During the survey year the Texas Supreme Court handed down two
decisions in the landlord-tenant area. In Oram v. General American Oil
Co. 243 the court held that a landlord's acceptance of rental payments after
being restored to sound mind constituted ratification of the lease and had the
effect of waiving or abandoning any right of rescission or attack upon any
alleged initial invalidity. In Big Country Homes, Inc. v. Christianson244 the
denial of a temporary injunction requiring the landlord to make available
possession of four mobile homes which the landlord had summarily seized
for non-payment of rent and for damages was held not to be an abuse of
discretion where a temporary order restraining the landlord from disposing of
or encumbering the four houses had been granted.
The constitutionality of two prejudgment landlord remedies came under
attack this past year, with neither of them passing muster in the courts' eyes
because of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In
Stevenson v. Cullen Center, Inc.2 45 the court held the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure relating to distress warrants 246 constitutionally deficient. The
court examined the United States Supreme Court decision in North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,247 noting three variables which had been
given emphasis by the Supreme Court in that case: (1) a judge's participation in the process, (2) the specificity of the allegations contained in the
affidavits which the judge relied upon in deciding whether to issue the writ,
and (3) the availablity of an immediate hearing after seizure to determine
the validity of the creditor's claims in an adversary setting. The court found
the Texas rules to be inadequate with regard to the last two requirements.
First, rule 610 makes no provision "for an affidavit which goes beyond
mere conclusory allegations or which clearly sets out the facts entitling the
creditor to his relief. ' 248 Second, no immediate post-seizure hearing is
243. 513 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. 1974).

244. 519 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. 1975), affg 513 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1974). For a lengthier discussion of this case and other related cases see Wallenstein
(1975) at 65-66.
245. 525 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
246. TEX. R. Civ. P. 610-20. The distress warrant statute can be found at TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5239 (1962).
247. 419 U.S. 601 (1975). North Georgia Finishing represents the fourth case in the
United States Supreme Court's tetralogy on procedural due process, along with Sniadach
v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), and
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). Many commentaries have been
written analyzing these decisions and their impact on Texas statutes and no doubt many
more will continue to be written. See, e.g., Anderson & L'Enfant, Fuentes v. Shevin:

Procedural Due Process and Louisiana Creditor's Remedies, 33 LA. L. REv. 62 (1972);
Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution,
59 VA. L. REV. 355 (1973); Hughes, Creditors' Self-Help Remedies Under UCC Section
9-503: Violative of Due Process in Texas?, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 701 (1973); Krahmer,
Clifford & Lasley, Fuentes v. Shevin: Due Process and the Consumer, A Legal and

Empirical Study, 4 TEX. TECH L. REV. 23 (1972); Schmitt & Peck, Self-Help Reposses-

sion-The Recurring Problems of Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 80

COM. L.J. 223 (1975); Scott, Constitutional Regulation of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost of ProceduralDue Process, 61 VA. L. REV. 807 (1975); 7 ST. MARY'S L.J.
613 (1975); 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 423 (1975); 29 Sw. L.J. 884 (1975); 29 Sw. L.J. 660
(1975); 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 756 (1975).

248. Stevenson v. Cullen Center, 525 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston

[14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).

In this particular case the affidavit did set out specific
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prescribed in the rules; in fact, no adversary proceeding is available until the
case is tried on its merits after progressing through the normal docketing
procedures. The due process clause also proved fatal to the new residential
landlord's lien statute 249 in Fancher v. Cronan,250 an unreported federal
district court case (which, however, the authors of this Article understand to
be in the process of being withdrawn). In Fancher the court held that
regardless of the provisions of a written lease agreement, seizure by a
landlord of a tenant's property without providing the tenant with prior notice
and an opportunity for a hearing is violative of the fourteenth amendment.
The court apparently ignored the language of article 5236d, section 5,
which limits self-help seizure to that done pursuant to a written contractual
agreement, and held that the new article, like its predecessor 25 1 (struck
down in Hall v. Garson26 2), authorizes state-like action by allowing the
landlord to remove the tenant's property without prior notice or hearing. The
court seized upon the somewhat dubious distinction which formed the basis
of two recent ,Fifth Circuit cases255 upholding section 9-503 of the Uniform
Commercial Code-that section 9-503 is concerned with repossession of
goods the purchase of which created the debt, while the landlord's lien
statute deals with the seizure of property which has nothing to do with the
creation of the debt. 254 Once the court had answered in the affirmative
that the requisite state action was present, it went on to find that the Mitchell
v. W.T. Grant Co. 255 decision had no application to a landlord's lien
situation on the ground that here the landlord had no legally recognized
interest in the property, as opposed to the interest of the seller in a sellerpurchaser relationship. 2 6 Finally, because of the absence of proof, the court
rejected the argument by the State of Texas as intervenor that the agreement
2 57
constituted a valid contractual waiver of a known right.
facts entitling the creditor to relief; however, the court implied that this was insufficient
where the rule itself makes no such requirement.
249. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236d (Supp. 1975-76).
250. Civ. No. 75-H-179 (S.ID. Tex., July 3, 1975). See generally 7 ST. MARY's L.J.
613 (1975).
251. Ch. 686, [1969] Tex. Laws 2008 (repealed 1973).
252. 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972).
253. Calderon v. United Furniture Co., 505 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1974); James v.
Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974).
254. This purchase-money distinction would appear to be vulnerable for at least two
reasons. First if a Uniform Commercial Code security interest can be created
in situations other than a purchase-money financing transaction, the courts may have
painted themselves into a corner by having adopted a rationale which would require
invalidation of those section 9-503 security interests which are not purchase-money
security interests. Second, the Uniform Commercial Code itself, in refusing to recognize
so-called "conditional sales" as being other than security interests, seems to reject the
foundation for the distinction (the purchase-money security interests should be elevated
to a special class for purposes of validating self-help remedies). See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-105, Comment 1.
255. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
256. Again, this argument is weak. A lien is a legally recognized interest in
property.
257. The court applied the Fuentes test that for a waiver to constitute an "intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," the waiver must appear in
type commensurate with the rest of the contract, must be bargained for on a status of full
and equal understanding of its meaning, and must be accompanied either by an
explanation of its impact or a specific description of what is in fact being waived. The
Fancher court noted that the waiver was part of a printed standard form and was a
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As a final installment in the landlord-tenant "due process trilogy," three
assaults were mounted against the forcible entry and detainer statute. 258 In
McCray v. Good,25 9 the only unsuccessful constitutional attack of the three,
the court held that where the tenant was given written notice and opportunity to be heard with counsel before a judicial tribunal prior to eviction, he was
not denied due process. In response to the other two cases (both unreported) 260 the only two apparent constitutional infirmities of the statute and
associated rules 2 1' were "cured" during the survey year by amendment of
the "immediate possession" rule 20 2 and the "appeal bond" rule. 26 3 -In
Carroll v. Knickerbocker264 the court held rule 740 unconstitutional as
violative of due process. Rule 740 required the defendant, upon the
execution of a bond by the plaintiff, to execute a counterbond in double the
amount of the plaintiff's bond within six days of service to remain in
possession. The amended rule, apparently modeled to conform with the
United States Supreme Court decision in Lindsey v. Normet, 65 which
upheld an Oregon forcible entry and wrongful detainer statute,2 6 6 now
allows the defendant either to post a counterbond in an amount fixed by the
justice of the peace within six days of service or to demand trial be held prior
to the expiration of the six-day period. 267 In Compton v. Naylor268 the
court held rule 750 unconstitutional in that it constituted an open-ended
bond by the sureties. The new rule allows the inclusion of a fixed ceiling as
to the liabilities of the sureties.
Although not imbued with novel legal implications, two cases should prove
worthy reading for any attorney representing shopping center developers. In
Avnsoe v. Square 67 Development Corp.269 a shopping center tenant sought
damages against a landlord, alleging that cancellation of the lease was
authorized because of the landlord's failure substantially to complete a
building on the date specified in the lease contract. The court, in reversing
necessary condition for rental. See generally Anderson, A Proposed Solution for the
Commercial World to the Sniadach-FuentesProblem: Contractual Waiver, 79 CASE &
COMMENT 24 (1974).
258. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3973 (1966).
259. 384 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
260. Carroll v. Knickerbocker, Civ. No. 3-74-241-B (N.D. Tex., Aug. 28, 1975),
dismissed as moot; Compton v. Naylor, Civ. No. 3-74-1013-B (N.D. Tex., Aug. 28,
1975), dismissed as moot. Both cases were dismissed following the amendment of rule
740.
261. TEx. R. Civ. P. 738-55.
262. TEx. R. Civ. P. 740.
263. TEx. R. Civ. P. 750.
264. Civ. No. 3-74-241-B (N.D. Tex., Aug. 28, 1975), dismissed as moot, consolidated with Salazar v. Amco Management Co., Civ. No. 3-74-415-B (N.D. Tex., Aug. 28,
1975), dismissed as moot. See also Wesley v. Colonial Tepeyac Apts., Civ. No. 3-74687-B (N.D. Tex., Aug. 28, 1975), dismissed as moot.
265. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
266. ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 105.105-.160 (1974). The only provisions that the Court
refused to uphold was the requirement that to appeal the tenant was required to post a
double bond which was automatically forfeited to the landlord if the landlord prevailed
on appeal.
267. TEx. R. Civ. P. 740(b), (c).
268. Civ. No. 3-74-1013-B (N.D. Tex., Aug. 28, 1975), dismissed as moot, consolidated with Lary v. Richburg, Civ. No. 3-74-909-B (N.D. Tex., Aug. 28, 1975), dismissed

as moot.

269. 521 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, no writ).
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the trial court, held that as a matter of law, the failure of the landlord to
pave a small triangular area contemplated as a parking area adjacent to the
proposed building constituted a deliberate departure from a material stipulation in the contract and remanded the case for the determination of the
tenant's damages. The danger of failing to act timely on a lease provision
was illustrated in Cox's Bakeries of North Dakota, Inc. v. Homart Development Corp.,270 in which a tenant sought damages for wrongful eviction and
conversion of personal property by the landlord, who counterclaimed for the
balance due on a promissory note and for accrued rent. The court held that
because the landlord had waived its right to terminate the tenant's possession
in October, the right to terminate in November would not be enforceable
without notice to the tenant that the landlord did intend to evict. 271 The
court also concluded that if the landlord's padlocking of the premises
constituted wrongful eviction, then the tenant would have a cause of action
for conversion and could receive damages for the value of the property so
taken.
While continuing to scrutinize the claims of landlords, the courts in actions
for rents by landlords demonstrated a willingness to find for the landlord in
273
appropriate cases.2 72 The trend mentioned in the 1974 Property Article
of courts' looking at the intent of the landlord in determining what constitutes
the landlord's acceptance of the tenant's surrender of the lease 27 4 appears to
be continuing, as demonstrated in Evans Young Wyatt, Inc. v. Hood & Hull
Co., 275 where the court held that for a lease to terminate as a matter of law
upon surrender and acceptance of the premises there must have been an
agreement to such effect by the parties, and such a determination is for the
trier of fact. 276 One federal court also dealt with the question of surrender
270. 515 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
271. This case illustrates the importance of having a nonwaiver clause in the lease,
which would have prevented the problem in the first place.
272. Williams v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 288 (N.D. Tex.
1975); Evans Young Wyatt, Inc. v. Hood & Hall Co., 517 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bevill v. Brakatselos, 516 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ); Hansen v. Ken Stoepel Ford, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 1
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ).
273. Wallenstein (1974) at 61-62.
274. Various jurisdictions have held at least three different standards. One group of

courts has held that surrender by operation of law is purely a matter of mutual intent
and thus a factual determination in each case. A second group has held that no

surrender by operation of law occurs if the landlord merely notifies the tenant that he is

attempting to relet on the tenant's behalf. A third group has held that upon the
landlord's reletting, regardless of intent, surrender occurs by operation of law. Texas
has always been considered as being in the first group, although some cases have
suggested that the courts might be moving to embrace the second standard. Recent cases

as noted in the text, however, indicate that Texas is still in the first group. For
commentary on when a landlord's reletting or efforts to relet after the tenant's abandonment or refusal to enter will be deemed acceptance of the surrender see Annot., 3 A.L.R.
1080 (1919); Annot., 52 A.L.R. 154 (1928); Annot., 61 A.L.R. 773 (1929); Annot.,

110 A.L.R. 368 (1937).
275. 517 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
276. Id. at 315, citing, e.g., Arrington v. Loveless, 486 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1972, no writ). See also Updegraff, The Element of Intent in Surrender by
Operation of Law, 38 HARv. L. REv. 64 (1924); Comment, The Landlord's Duty To
Mitigate by Accepting a Proffered Acceptable Sub-Tenant-Illinois and Missouri, 10 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 532 (1966); Comment, Lease Drafting and Surrender by Operation of Law,
41 TExAs L. REv. 428 (1963).
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In Williams v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical

Sales, Inc.2 77 the court noted that under Texas law there is no general

obligation on the part of the landlord to mitigate damages by procuring a
new or substitute tenant when confronted with an abandonment by a
tenant, 27 s but that a duty to mitigate is imposed once the landlord has reentered the premises 27 9 (with the burden to show that losses could have
been avoided by reasonable effort falling on the one who caused the
breach 28 0 ). The court found that the action of the landlord in making
extensive renovations and attempting to re-lease the space at a rent higher
In Hansen
than the lease rent constituted a re-entry as a matter of law. 2 8
v. Ken Stoepel Ford, Inc. 28 2 the court held that the period of limitations
under article 5527 in a suit for rent under a lease providing that the rent was
payable in advance on the first of each month began to run on the day that
the rent was due.
A reminder to attorneys to make clear for whose benefit a specific
provision is written is contained in Taco Boy, Inc. v. Redelco Co.,28 3 in
which the court, rejecting a unique argument by the tenant suggesting that he
was relieved of his lease obligations because the lease contract provided for
termination of the lease on non-payment of rent, held that because the
provision was obviously for the benefit of the lessor, he alone had the right
of terminating the lease on such breach. 284 Another caveat is found in
Ferrari v. Bauerle,28 5 a case whose appeal may not be limited to its legal
significance. In Ferrarithe court held that a permitted use clause in a lease,
allowing the tenant to engage only in "traffic in foods and beverages," did
not permit live entertainment, which in the particular case consisted of
topless female dancers. 28 6 While not particularly sympathetic to the lessee's
particular selection of live entertainment, the dissent argued that the trial
court's injunction should be modified so as not to prevent the "usual and
28 7
customary entertainment" found in supper clubs.

277. 396 F. Supp. 288 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
278. Id. at 292, citing, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Edwards, 96 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1936, writ dism'd). See generally Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 534 (1968).
279. 396 F. Supp. at 292-93, citing, e.g., 'Evons v. Winkler, 388 S.W.2d 265, 269-70
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Employment Advisors,
Inc. v. Sparks, 364 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco), writ rel'd n.r.e., 368 S.W.2d
199 (1963) (per curiam). See also Early v. Isaacson, 31 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1930, writ ref'd).
280. 396 F. Supp. at 293, citing Polis v. Alford, 273 S.W.2d 79, 80 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd). For a discussion of what constitutes re-entry see
Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 534 (1968).
281. 396 F. Supp. at 293-94. The court noted that an effort at seeking market rental
value is not in itself fatal to a contention of no re-entry. Id. at 294, citing In re
Garment Center Capitol, 93 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1938).
282. 515 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ).
283. 515 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ); cf. Pendleton
Green Associates v. Anchor Sav. Bank, 520 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1975, no writ).
284. The case provides a lesson for those drafting leases to be sure to specify for
whose benefit a certain provision is to be operative.
285. 519 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
286. "We conclude that the common and ordinarily accepted meanings of the rather
prosaic terms, 'bakery and associated purposes' and 'traffic in food and beverages' do not
encompass, and may not be so stretched to encompass the trooping of partially clad
females." Id. at 147.
287. See also Butts v. Somers, 441 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969, no
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In State National Bank v. United States2s8 the Fifth Circuit, defining a
lease as a transfer of, an interest in and possession of property for a
prescribed period of time in exchange for an agreed consideration called
"rent," held that where an agreement possessed sufficient characteristics of
both a lease and a management agreement, whether payments under the
agreement were tax exempt rent or unrelated business rent was a question of
fact. In Teague v. Roper 28 9 the court held that the same elements
necessary to remove a parol sale from the operation of the statute of

frauds2 90 were necessary to remove a parol lease from its operation,
namely (1) payment of consideration whether money or services, (2)
possession, and (3) valuable improvements made with consent of or in the

presence of facts which make the transaction a fraud on the one seeking to
291
enforce the lease or sale.
As usual, the survey year provided a substantial number of tort cases
between landlord and tenant. 292 For example, in Stacks v. Rushing293 the
court held that where the landlord's promise to repair is an inducement for

the tenant to pay more rent than is currently due under a short term lease,
the promise to repair is supported by consideration and becomes one of the
terms of the tenancy. And in Vanderburg v. Drake294 the court reaffirmed

the principle that in the absence of an agreement requiring the landlord to
repair the premises and in the absence of the landlord's fraud or concealment

in failing to disclose any unknown or hidden defects known to him, the tenant
alone is liable for injury to his invitees by virtue of the premises' unsafe condition. 295 Barraganv. Munoz, 296 involving suit to recover for water damage,
was interesting for its application of the "holdover doctrine. '297 The court

found that an exculpatory clause of the lease (which the court found not to
be against public policy) became a covenant during the holding over
period.

298

V.

PRIVATE RESTRICTIONS ON LAND USE

As in past years, the majority of cases involving private restrictions on
writ) (court construed provision prohibiting construction of "drive-in cafe" to encompass
a restaurant similar to a "Toddle House" with all services inside and no take-out
window).
288. 509 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1975).
289. 526 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
290. TEx. Bus. &COMM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (1967); Tax. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
1288 (1962).
291. See Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122, 229 S.W. 1114 (1921).
292. Barragan v. Munoz, 525 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ);
Stacks v. Rushing, 518 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ); Vanderburg
v. Drake, 518 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ dism'd).
293. 518 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
294. 518 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ dism'd).
295. See, e.g., Wallace v. Horn, 506 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
296. 525 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ).
297. The doctrine provides that proof of a tenant's holding over after the expiration
of a term fixed in the lease gives rise to a presumption that in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, he continues to be bound by the same covenants which were binding upon
him during the lease term. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 480, 483 (1956).
298. See generally Wallenstein (1974) at 61-62.
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land use have involved restrictive covenants in residential areas. In Tejas
Trail Property Owners Ass'n v. Holt299 the court, relying upon the principle
of laches, affirmed the denial of both temporary and permanent injunctions to
enforce a restrictive convenant limiting the use of permissible roofing
structural materials. ,In that case the plaintiff had waited until the roof had
been completed, although several officers of the plaintiff knew of the
proposed construction (including the use of material in violation of the
restrictive covenant) the previous month. In Stephenson v. Perlitz30° the
court, apparently following the rule of strict construction against the grantor
in favor of the grantee, held that a restrictive covenant permitting "only one
residence [to be] erected upon the premises" did not prohibit the construction of a duplex or two-unit dwelling on the propertyA0 l The court relied
heavily on McDonald v. Painter,30 2 which as the dissent noted held merely
that the term "residences" included duplexes. The Perlitz court went on to
conclude, based upon out-of-state decisions, that "one residence" could include one duplex. 803 The dissent noted a 1926 decision80 4 involving a
restriction prohibiting more than one residence which the court had construed as preventing the construction of an apartment house with eight living
units. The dissent's argument that the McDonald case is not controlling
is persuasive, especially since the deed restriction mentions both "residential
purposes" and "one residence." Unless the latter phrase is to be construed
as mere surplusage it would indicate that the intention of the grantor was not
merely to restrict the property to residential use, but to restrict it to one
residence (i.e., a single family dwelling).30 5 Similarly, in a suit for
temporary injunction against construction the court in Sleepy Hollow Development Co. v. South Park Civic Club30 6 construed the designation of 100foot wide lots in a recorded plat with restrictions against the construction of
any residence on a lot less than sixty feet wide to indicate the intention of the
dedicators to create a subdivision of residential lots each 100 feet wide for
single family dwellings, but not to restrict the property against the placing of
a residential structure on any building lot which was sixty feet or more in
width.
In a not surprising decision the court in York v. Howard30 7 recognized
the validity of mutual negative equitable easements, holding that where the
owner of a tract of land subdivides it and sells distinct parcels thereof to
299. 516 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ).
300. 524 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975), rev'd, 19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
161 (Feb. 7, 1976).
301. But see Lehmann v. Wallace, 510 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in Wallenstein (1975) at 59 (court held restrictions
upon construction of more than one residence per lot could not be defeated by dividing a
lot into two smaller lots).
302. 441 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1969).
303. 524 S.W.2d at 787-88.
304. Green v. Gerner, 283 S.W. 615 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1926), all'd, 289
S.W. 999 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted).
305. See generally Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 1376 (1950). [Editor's Note: In reversing
the court of civil appeals' decision the supreme court relied essentially on the dissent. 19
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 161 (Feb. 7, 1976).]
306. 524 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ).
307. 521 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
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separate grantees, imposing deed restrictions upon its use pursuant to a
general scheme or plan of development or improvement, such restrictions
may be enforced by any grantee against any other grantee.308 The court
also found no ambiguity in the prohibition of moving an "old house" onto the
property, holding that the restriction prohibited the moving of an old house
which was to be largely rebuilt and expanded. In Phillips v. Zmotony30 9
the court held that a mobile home was a "trailer" within the scope of a
restrictive covenant prohibiting the placement as a residence of any trailer on
the tract in question.310 The court was not persuaded by the defendants'
argument that the trailer had not been purchased for use as a trailer, but had
been purchased solely for placement on the property in question. 3 1'
Finally, in a different area of private restrictions on land use, that of
nuisance, the court in Lacy Feed Co. v. Parrish 12 held that a finding of
negligence was unnecessary to recover for the consequences of a voluntary
and intentional nuisance, such as the operation of turkey pens next to the
plaintiff's property. The court also held that damages were recoverable both
as to damage to the property (i.e., loss in market value and loss of the use
and enjoyment of the property) and as to damage to the person of the
plaintiff, (i.e., personal discomfort, annoyance, and inconvenience), but
that exemplary damages were inappropriate since there was no evidence of
any wrongful intent on the defendant's part to injure the plaintiff or of any
willful disregard of the plaintiff's rights. Finally, in another nuisance case,
Adler v. City of Farmers Branch,313 the court held that where an action for
nuisance was based upon invasion and trespass of material being used for a
landfill on adjacent property and the land owners had actual knowledge of it,
the period of limitation would begin to run even though the damage was at
31 4
that time very slight.
VI.

MISCELLANEOUS

PersonalProperty. The following cases present a short summary of personal
property cases. The court in Loomis v. Sharp3 15 held that the conversion of
property is a "trespass" within the meaning of the ninth exception to the
general venue statute.3 1

6

Two cases 3 17 held that a non-tenured teacher did

not have a constitutionally protectible property interest in his re-employ308. See Hooper v. Lottman, 171 S.W. 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1914, no writ).
309. 525 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), rev'd on other
grounds, 529 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1975).
310. Accord, Bullock v. Kattner, 502 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in Wallenstein (1975) at 57. But see Hussey v. Ray, 462 S.W.2d
45 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970, no writ); Crawford v. Boyd, 453 S.W.2d 232 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
311. But see Atkins v. Fine, 508 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ),
discussed in Wallenstein (1975) at 58.
312. 517 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
313. 526 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
314. See Linkenhoger v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 152 Tex. 534, 260 S.W.2d 884
(1953); Houston Water-Works Co. v. Kennedy, 70 Tex. 233, 8 S.W. 36 (1888).
315. 519 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, writ dism'd).
316. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, subd. 9 (1964).
317. Siler v. Brady Ind. School Dist., 393 F. Supp. 1143 (W.D. Tex. 1975); Johnson
v. Harvey, 382 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
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ment. 18 ,In the area of bailments, the Texas Supreme Court held that
section 7.204(a) of the Business and Commerce Code is not applicable to an
unauthorized delivery of goods to a person not producing a warehouse
receipt. 3 19 One supreme court case held that a prima facie presumption of
negligence on the part of the bailee arises when the bailor proves the
existence of a bailment for mutual benefit, a delivery of the chattel to the
bailee, and a failure of the bailee to redeliver. 320 And in Allright, Inc. v.
Elledge3 2' the Texas Supreme Court held that a parking lot owner's
limitation of liability to a maximum of $100 for theft of the vehicle by a
written agreement with a month-to-month customer was not void as against
public policy. 22 The court noted that its holding was based upon the
absence of any fact in the court of civil appeals opinion or in the certified
question indicating an absence of bargaining power of a parking lot customer. With regard to common carriers one court3 23 held that a shipper
establishes a prima facie case of carrier liability when he shows that the
shipment was in good condition upon delivery to the carrier and in damaged
condition or destroyed in transit, rebuttable by the carrier upon a showing
that the damage or loss was caused solely by one of the common law
excepted perils. 32 4 Jurisdictional and limitations questions arose in two
325
other cases.
Water Rights. Water rights cases this past year included a statutory cause of
action for pollution,3 26 a suit by the owner of riparian rights to set aside an
order of the Water Rights Commission granting others a permit to appropriate state water by construction of a dam and a reservoir, 327 a suit by several
members of a municipal water district against the water authority and other
318. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Collins v.
Wolfson, 498 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1974); Robinson v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,
485 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1973).

319. Turner v. Scobey Moving & Storage Co., 515 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. 1974).
320. Buchanan v. Byrd, 519 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1975), rev'g 515 S.W.2d 378 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1974); accord, Trammell v. Whitlock, 150 Tex. 500, 242 S.W.2d

157 (1951); Zable v. Huff, 432 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968, no writ);
Big "D" Auto Auction, Inc. v. Harley Hightower, 368 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1963, no writ); Rhodes v. Turner, 171 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth), mandamus to certify questions ref'd sub nom. Rhodes v. McDonald, 141 Tex.
478, 172 S.W.2d 972 (1943); Callihan v. Montrief, 71 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1934, writ ref'd).
321. 515 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1974).
322. Cf. McAshan v. Cavitt, 149 Tex. 148, 229 S.W.2d 1016 (1950); Ford v.
McWilliams, 278 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1955, no writ); Vollmer v.
Stoneleigh-Maple Terrace, Inc., 226 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1950, writ
ref'd); Munger Automobile Co. v. American Lloyds, 267 S.W. 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Waco 1924, no writ).
323.

Boyd v. McCleskey, 515 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1974, no writ).

324. Id. at 27 (listing excepted perils as fault of the shipper or inherent nature of
goods).

325. Platoro Ltd., Inc. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 508 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir.
1975) (absence of in rem jurisdiction in admiralty because of the absence of the res in
the district both when suit filed and during the pendency of the action); Luther Moving
& Storage v. Roberts, 526 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ) (over
two years passed before filing of suit of wrongful conversion).
326. City of Galveston v. State, 518 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, no writ).
327. Webster v. Texas Water Rights Comm'n, 518 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

1976]

PROPERTY

members of the district, challenging the method by which operational and
maintenance costs were being charged against the member cities,3 28 and a
recognition of a duty to warn on the part of the person who creates a
dangerous situation, regardless of any negligence being shown. 3 2 9
Other Cases. In one case the proper measure of damages for the removal of
a fence was held to be the reasonable value of the fence as an enclosure at
the time of its removal with proper consideration of the cost of replacing the
fence with a new fence of substantially the same construction.3 3 0 A court of
civil appeals case 331 held the expansion of a hospital district constitutional
because of the absence in the state constitution of any specific provision or
implication of a prohibition of such an expansion or boundary change. In
Cobra Oil & Gas Corp. v. Armstrong33 2 it was held that under former
article 5397 the declaration of a forfeiture by the commissioner was a
discretionary act which could be effective without the ministerial act of
recording, and which could be accomplished orally followed by the prompt
recordation of the oral declaration. Provisions of the Legislative Validating
Act 333 and the Municipal Annexation Act 33 4 were applied in City of Grand
Prairie v. Turner.335 Other miscellaneous cases included an action by a
member of a non-profit corporation for injunctive relief in connection with
the corporation's sale of its grazing land,3 3 6 and a suit by a city to recover
33 7
personal property taxes.

'328. Canadian River Municipal Water Authority v. City of Amarillo, 517 S.W.2d 572
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
329. Chrysler Corp. v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 522 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
330. Jackson v. Wallis, 514 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974,

no writ).
331. Stamford Hosp. Dist. v. Vinson, 517 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
332. 520 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ).
333. Thx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 974d-13 (Supp. 1975-76).
334. Id. art. 970a (1973).
335. 515 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
336. Fulbright Grazing Ass'n, Inc. v. Randolph, 524 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1975, no writ).
337. Ana-Log, Inc. v. City of Tyler, 520 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975,

no writ).

